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ARTICLES
SPEAK NOW OR HOLD YOUR PEACE:
PREARBITRATION EXPRESS WAIVERS OF
EVIDENT-PARTIALITY CHALLENGES
EDWARD C. DAWSON*
This Article proposes that parties and arbitrators should use, and courts
should enforce, express prearbitration waivers of certain evident-partiality
challenges as a way to avoid uncertainty and expense caused by widelyacknowledged disarray in the doctrine of evident partiality.
Courts
considering evident-partiality cases mainly have focused on (and disagreed
about) the content of the doctrine and the circumstances in which a party can
constructively waive an evident-partiality challenge by failing to object to an
arbitrator despite knowing about a particular relationship. Similarly, the
academic literature examining evident partiality has focused on the
appropriate judicial test for assessing partiality, rules for defining the scope of
an arbitrator’s duty to disclose, and proposals for reconciling the division in
the courts. This Article takes a different approach. It is the first examination
of the use of party waivers to cut off judicial evident-partiality challenges and
avoid the uncertainties in the doctrine. The solution proposed in this Article is
that parties can consensually avoid the current uncertainty over evidentpartiality doctrine through express prearbitration agreements to waive certain
judicial challenges. This Article explains why using express evident-partiality
waivers should be attractive to parties. It also argues that courts should be
willing to enforce such waivers under the Federal Arbitration Act. Enforcing
them is theoretically consistent with arbitration’s fundamental policies of
* Teaching Fellow and Assistant Professor of Professional Practice, Paul M.
Hebert LSU Law Center. Thanks to Ben Aguiñaga for his excellent research assistance,
to Professor Bradley Areheart and to participants in a faculty workshop at Paul M.
Hebert Law Center for helpful comments, and to the editors and staff of the
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resolving disputes based on the parties’ consent and allowing the parties to
choose for themselves the most efficient procedures to resolve their dispute.
These policies are strongly reinforced by recent Supreme Court opinions in other
areas of arbitration law.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the few ways a losing party can challenge the result of an
arbitration in an American court1 is to argue that the arbitrator
displayed “evident partiality” that tainted the arbitration.2 Evident
partiality essentially means that either the arbitrator was actually
biased in favor of a party, or there were facts unknown to the
parties that could make an objective observer think the arbitrator
was biased.3
Beyond that essence, however, courts and theorists are and have
long been deeply divided about the content and the application of
the doctrine of evident partiality, offering different formulations of
the evident-partiality test and reaching conflicting results in similar
cases.4 At the same time, judicial reduction of alternative avenues to
challenge arbitration awards, such as “manifest disregard” of law or
1. This Article focuses on the confirmation of arbitration awards in U.S. federal
and state courts, primarily under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16
(2012), and analogous state statutes. Most state arbitration acts are modeled on the
FAA, including their evident-partiality provisions. See, e.g., Stephen K. Huber, The
Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit: Round IV, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 463, 501
(2004) (discussing the resolution of arbitration cases through federal and state law).
Also, many state courts look to federal jurisprudence, especially U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, to interpret their statutes. See e.g., Daiichi Haw. Real Estate Corp. v.
Lichter, 82 P.3d 411, 425–34 (Haw. 2003) (surveying Supreme Court jurisprudence
to define statutory terms); Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 632–37
(Tex. 1997) (examining Supreme Court jurisprudence and circuit court precedent
regarding issues that commonly arise in disputes centered on the arbitrator himself);
Richco Structures v. Parkside Vill., Inc., 263 N.W.2d 204, 211–12 (Wis. 1978) (same).
In particular, state courts often interpret evident-partiality doctrine under state
statutes by reference to the FAA and federal cases, particularly the Supreme Court’s
seminal decision in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145
(1968). See e.g., Gonzales v. Interinsurance Exch., 148 Cal. Rptr. 282, 285 (Ct. App.
1978) (looking to Commonwealth Coatings for guidance on interpretation of
California’s arbitrator-bias standard); Beebe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. InSight Health Servs.
Corp., 751 A.2d 426, 432 (Del. Ch. 1999) (looking to the FAA and Commonwealth
Coatings decision for guidance in interpreting meaning of evident partiality under
Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act); Drinane v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 606
N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ill. 1992) (applying Commonwealth Coatings to interpretation of
bias standard under Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act); TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at 632–37
(relying upon federal jurisprudence interpreting the FAA and noting how divisions
in the federal case law have confused and divided state courts interpreting state
statutes). Therefore, this Article analyzes the current divisions in evident-partiality
doctrine, and proposes an express-waiver solution, in terms of the generalized
doctrine as applied both in federal and state American courts.
2. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (allowing judicial vacatur of an arbitration award “where
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them”).
3. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 147 (explaining that in addition to
meaning actual bias, it also means concealed material information). Evident
partiality also includes actual bias, but because most of the litigation and uncertainty
in this area involves challenges based on claims of objective impressions or
appearances of bias. This Article uses “evident partiality” to refer to those types of
challenges. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part I.B.
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facts,5 has increased pressure on the fractured evident-partiality
doctrine. “Manifest disregard” refers to the judicially-crafted doctrine
allowing vacatur of an award based on the “manifest disregard” of
facts or law by the arbitral panel.6
With greater frequency,
disappointed losing parties mount evident-partiality challenges as
their best hope for overturning an award. As a result, before an
arbitration, parties face significant uncertainty and the unattractive
possibility of extended, expensive post-arbitration litigation of an
evident-partiality challenge.
While courts and scholars wrestle with defining and rationalizing
evident partiality, this Article recommends a different approach:
Parties can use express, prearbitration7 waivers of evident-partiality
objections to reduce uncertainty and increase efficiency by
foreclosing a large number of the most inefficient type of evidentpartiality challenges. The Article’s core argument is that concerned
parties can use waivers to avoid the muddle of current evidentpartiality doctrine. At the same time, courts should enforce these
waivers as consistent with arbitration’s fundamental principles of
consensual dispute resolution and procedural efficiency.8
After this introduction, Part II gives background about the doctrine
of evident partiality, explaining its origins and purposes, and
describing the workings of the pre-arbitration disclosure process and
post-award judicial evident-partiality challenges. It then introduces
the problem caused by current and enduring uncertainties about the
content and application of the evident-partiality doctrine, combined
with the increased pressure placed on the doctrine’s disuniformities
by the judicial elimination or narrowing of other avenues to
challenge arbitral awards, such as “manifest disregard.”
5. See Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1991)
(explaining that a finding of manifest disregard requires more than a minor error in
the application of law; instead manifest disregard requires, for example, that an
arbitrator correctly state the law and then proceed by failing to apply it).
6. See infra Part I.B.2.
7. “Prearbitration” is used in this Article to mean “after the arbitration process
has begun but before the arbitration hearing,” and not “prior to any arbitration
proceedings being initiated.”
8. I encountered the idea for a prearbitration express waiver of evidentpartiality while working on one of the cases discussed in this Article, Ponderosa Pine
Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. App. 2012). In that case,
the arbitral panel—specifically, the chief arbitrator, Justice Baker—issued an order
stating that the parties had agreed to waive any conflicts. Id. at 362. Ultimately, the
appellate court reversed the district court’s decision to invalidate the award based
upon the theory of “constructive waiver,” see infra notes 67–69 and accompanying
text, rather than analyzing the waiver order in the arbitral record. Ponderosa Pine,
376 S.W.3d at 376. In the interest of full disclosure, I have no financial interest in
the outcome of that case, which is now pending before the Texas Supreme Court.
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Part III argues that litigants ought to use, and judges ought to
enforce, express waivers of evident-partiality objections as a way to
avoid the problems created by the current disarray in and pressure
on the doctrine. This Part first explains how an express-waiver
procedure would work, and focuses on express waivers that would bar
evident-partiality challenges based on relationships that are somehow
disclosed by the arbitrator prior to the arbitration. It then explains
the practical virtues of express waivers to parties by showing how they
can greatly reduce the problems and uncertainties created by the
current fractures in evident-partiality doctrine. Finally, it offers a
theoretical argument for judicial enforcement of these waivers that is
rooted in arbitration’s fundamental principles of mutual consent and
procedural efficiency.
This argument is connected to recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence in other areas of arbitration law that
emphasizes parties’ ability and flexibility to determine by consent the
procedures that will govern their arbitration.
Part IV addresses potential objections to the use and enforcement
of express, pre-arbitration waivers of evident partiality challenges.
Among the objections addressed are arguments that enforcing
express waivers would create bad incentives for arbitrators to be less
than forthcoming in their disclosures, conflict with arbitration
statutes or arbitral rules, and worsen the unfairness caused by binding
arbitration agreements in consumer and employment law. This
Article argues that the proposal is consistent with arbitration statutes
and rules. If properly limited to challenges based on disclosed
relationships, the proposal has minimal potential for sanctioning
fraud or unfairness and would allow the parties a fair amount of
flexibility to determine the scope of waivers for themselves.
Furthermore, general concerns about the unfairness of certain kinds
of arbitration are not a good reason to refuse to enforce the
proposed waivers because the current disorder in evident-partiality
doctrine is not a good safety valve for unfairness in particular types of
arbitration agreements.
I.

EVIDENT-PARTIALITY DOCTRINE: BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM
A. Evident Partiality and the Arbitration Disclosure Process

1.

Evident partiality-doctrine: Origins and core content
Under most domestic arbitration statutes, including the Federal
Arbitration Act, there are only a few prescribed avenues to oppose
judicial confirmation of an arbitration award issued by an arbitral
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panel.9 The avenues are limited by design because one of
arbitration’s most important purposes as an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism is to increase efficiency10, in part by
avoiding, or at least limiting, collateral judicial proceedings to
confirm the award.11
One of the few available statutory bases for opposing award
confirmation in court is a challenge based on “evident partiality,”
which is the focus of this Article.12 The statutory evident-partiality
doctrine allows a challenger to vacate an award by showing that the
arbitrator was biased or was unfit to serve based on facts13 that would
indicate that he might be biased. Since Commonwealth Coatings Corp.
v. Continental Casualty Corp.,14 the Supreme Court’s first and only
9. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2012) (discussing the procedure for modifying and
challenging awards).
10. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995)
(describing arbitration as “usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can have
simpler procedural and evidentiary rules . . . it is often more flexible in regard to
scheduling of times and places of hearings and discovery devices” (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 97–542, at 13 (1982))); R. Wilson Freyermuth, Foreclosure by Arbitration?, 37 PEPP.
L. REV. 459, 477 (2010) (“By allowing the parties to select their own decision maker,
procedural rules and timetables, and substantive rules of decision, and by according
finality to the award, arbitration ostensibly permits parties to create a dispute
resolution process that can produce a final result much more rapidly than public
adjudication.”). But see Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for
Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 434 (2000)
(arguing that “arbitration’s technical advantages” are “seriously eroded”); Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) (noting
that it is now common to speak of arbitration as judicialized, formal, costly, timeconsuming, and subject to hardball advocacy).
11. See, e.g., Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013)
(“Under the FAA, courts may vacate an arbitrator’s decision only in very unusual
circumstances. That limited judicial review, we have explained, maintain[s]
arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. If parties could take
full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals, arbitration would become merely a prelude to
a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process.” (alteration in
original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stolt-Nielsen S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010) (describing the “high
hurdle” challengers must cross to vacate an arbitral award).
12. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2). The other statutory bases for vacatur under the FAA are
(1) “where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means,” (2)
“where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct,” and (3) “where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award on the subject was not made”). Id. § 10(a)(1), (3)–(4).
13. In theory, the facts must have been unknown to the challenging party until
after the arbitration, but in practice there is much division and uncertainty about
exactly when an evident-partiality challenge will fail because it is based on “known”
facts. Infra Part II.B.
14. 393 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968) (“We can perceive no way in which the
effectiveness of the arbitration process will be hampered by the simple requirement
that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of
possible bias. . . . [A]ny tribunal . . . not only must be unbiased but also must avoid
even the appearance of bias. We cannot believe that it was the purpose of Congress
to authorize litigants to submit their cases and controversies to arbitration boards
that might reasonably be thought biased against one litigant and favorable to
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decision interpreting this provision, it is clear that evident partiality
includes not only actual bias but also an objective “impression of
possible bias.” Further, since an “impression of bias” is easier to show
than actual bias, most parties raising “evident partiality” challenges
focus on trying to show facts that create an impression of bias.15 This
Article similarly focuses primarily on these “objective” evident
partiality challenges.
In broad terms, the essential components of an objective evidentpartiality challenge are 1) that the arbitrator had a significant
relationship with a party or party counsel 2) that could or would have
caused an objective observer to think she was biased, and 3) that she
did not sufficiently disclose that relationship to allow the other party
to make an informed decision to proceed despite the conflict.16 So,
for example, a core case of evident partiality might be one where the
arbitrator was a close personal friend of counsel for one of the parties
to the arbitration, and entirely failed to disclose that relationship to
the opposing party.17 Beyond these broad terms and the core of
factually easy cases, however, there is extensive and longstanding
uncertainty as to what suffices to show evident partiality.18
another.”). For an explanation of the difference between actual bias and impression
of bias, see, for example, Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial
Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial
Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 455 n.47 (1998), which discusses the
different standards of proof between “impression of bias” and “actual bias” cases. See
also Roger J. Perlstadt, Comment, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1983, 1996–97 (2002) (noting that although “[t]he text of Section
10 [of the FAA] implies that ‘evident partiality’ must be shown by proof of actual
bias,” courts have adopted less stringent standards).
15. See, e.g., Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509, 548
(2009) (“Proof of actual bias is all but impossible, short of a string of incriminating emails, so apparent bias is the only realistic option for establishing that vacatur is
warranted.”); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1061–62 (2000)
(describing proof of actual bias as “both rare and difficult” as juxtaposed with proof
of “evident” bias); see also Eric Lucentini, Comment, Taking a Fresh Look at Vacatur of
Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 359, 362 (1996) (“[I]f a
party can show ‘evident partiality’ under the FAA merely by identifying a relationship
between an arbitrator and an opposing party, her task will be far easier than if she
must show that an arbitrator actually behaved in a partial manner.”).
16. See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 146–50 (comparing corrupt
arbitration proceedings to rulings from a partial court).
17. See, e.g., Karlseng v. Cooke, 346 S.W.3d 85, 87–93 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding
that the arbitrator was required to disclose his social relationship with an attorney
who represented a party to the arbitration).
18. Indeed, almost every component just described is a subject of division and
uncertainty, including what is a sufficiently significant relationship to create the
impression of partiality, how strong the objective impression has to be to establish
evident partiality, and when the arbitrator has disclosed enough about a relationship
to prevent it being the basis of a post-award evident-partiality challenge. See infra
Part I.B.
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2.

Evident partiality-process: Arbitrators’ disclosures and judicial challenges
The success of any judicial evident-partiality challenge heavily
depends on, and is often determined by, the pre-arbitration process
for arbitrators to fulfill their duty to disclose any potential conflicts.
Arbitrators have a continuing ethical duty to disclose any potential
conflicts: material relationships that might give an impression of
partiality.19 Evident-partiality doctrine operates, in part, as a way to
police the arbitrator’s fulfillment of this duty, since an arbitrator who
fails to disclose a significant relationship or fails to disclose it in
sufficient detail risks vacatur of the award.20
To allow arbitrators to fulfill their duty to disclose, many arbitral
rules provide a process for the arbitrator to make these disclosures.21
They also often provide a process for parties to object to an arbitrator
based on information in the disclosures, and for resolving that
19. See, e.g., THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
Canon II.C, available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial_disputes.pdf
(listing the types of relationships and interests arbitrators must disclose and stating
that “[t]he obligation to disclose [these] interests or relationships . . . is a continuing
duty which requires a person who accepts appointment as an arbitrator to disclose, as
soon as practicable, at any stage of the arbitration any such interests or relationships
which may arise, or which are recalled or discovered”); see also UNCITRAL
ARBITRATION RULES Art. 11 (United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 2010),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised
/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf (“An arbitrator, from the time of his or her
appointment and throughout the arbitral proceedings, shall without delay disclose
any such circumstances to the parties and the other arbitrators unless they have
already been informed by him or her of these circumstances.”); COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 16(a) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n 2009), available at
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103&revision
=latestreleased (“Any person appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator shall
disclose to the AAA any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, including any bias or any financial or
personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present relationship
with the parties or their representatives. Such obligation shall remain in effect
throughout the arbitration.”); JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES
R. 12(i) (Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Servs., Inc. 2009), available at http://www
.jamsadr.com/rules-streamlined-arbitration/#Rule12 (“The obligation of the
Arbitrator to make all required disclosures continues throughout the
Arbitration process.”).
20. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing how
arbitrators’ obligations under the evident-partiality doctrine “gives arbitrators an
incentive to be forthright with the parties, honestly disclosing what arbitrators might
otherwise have an incentive to hide”).
21. The disclosure process varies only slightly under various arbitral rules.
Compare COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 16
(obligating disclosure to the AAA, which then communicates the information to the
parties), with UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES Art. 11 (requiring disclosure to the
parties and the other arbitrators). Both the AAA and UNCITRAL rules require
disclosure of anything that might give rise to “justifiable doubt about the arbitrator’s
impartiality or dependence” throughout the entire arbitral proceeding. COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 16; see also UNCITRAL
ARBITRATION RULES Art. 11 (requiring disclosure of “justifiable doubts” of an
arbitrator’s impartiality).
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objection.22 While there are variations, often the way the disclosure
process works is that the arbitrators23 disclose, and the parties may ask
Then, if neither party objects to any
follow-up questions.24
arbitrator’s serving, or if a party unsuccessfully challenges one of the
panelists, the arbitration proceeds.25
In particular, the disclosure process (and the flexibility of that
process) may vary depending on whether the arbitration is ad hoc or
institutional, a decision made by the parties in their arbitration
agreement—that is, the initial contract or contractual clause under
which the parties agree to use arbitration to resolve dispute, and
specify the rules that will govern any arbitration.26 Institutional
22. See, e.g., UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES Art. 12 (detailing the avenues for
challenging and removing an arbitrator and explaining reasons for such challenges,
including if there are justifiable doubts about the arbitrator’s partiality or an
arbitrator’s failure to act).
23. This supposes that there is a three-arbitrator panel, with two party-nominated
arbitrators and a third chosen jointly by the party nominees.
See, e.g.,
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 146 (1968)
(involving an arbitration agreement with this type of procedure). In that scenario,
each party will scrutinize the disclosures of its opponent’s nominee and the jointlychosen third. Party-proposed arbitrators may either be neutral or partial, but this
Article focuses only on neutrals since evident-partiality challenges can only be made
against neutral arbitrators. See, e.g., Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council
Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing the history of
evident partiality in the “neutral arbitrator” context established by Commonwealth
Coatings); Deseriee A. Kennedy, Predisposed with Integrity: The Elusive Quest for Justice in
Tripartite Arbitrations, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 749, 776 (1995) (noting that most courts
“refuse to find a non-neutral arbitrator capable of evident partiality as . . . nonneutral arbitrators are permitted to be predisposed toward their nominating party”).
There also may be a sole arbitrator (who must always be neutral), in which case both
parties will scrutinize his disclosures. See generally Toby Landau, Composition and
Establishment of the Tribunal, 9 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 45, 48–58 (1998) (describing the
selection and retention of a sole arbitrator).
24. See e.g., Stone v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d 435, 440–41 (E.D. Pa.
2012) (noting FINRA instruction to arbitrators to invite questions after disclosure);
McKinney Drilling Co. v. Mach I Ltd. P’ship, 359 A.2d 100, 102 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1976) (demonstrating the court’s ability to allow parties to ask further questions
about an arbitrator’s disclosure); Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy,
Inc., 376 S.W.3d 358, 372 (Tex. App. 2012) (noting parties’ ability to ask questions);
Ruth V. Glick, Arbitrator Disclosure: Recommendation for a New UAA Standard, 13 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 89, 101 (1997) (“[P]arties may waive objections to the
appearance of bias, request more information about the relationship from the
arbitrator, or challenge the arbitrator for cause.”).
25. Since this Article is about express pre-arbitration waivers of evident-partiality
challenges, scenarios in which a party does raise a challenge are not relevant. It is
worth noting, however, that raising a prearbitration challenge preserves it challenge
for judicial review, and that prearbitration challenges are made and resolved under
the applicable arbitral rules. See, e.g., UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES Art. 12
(providing procedure for challenging arbitrator).
26. See, e.g., Maya Ganguly, Tribunals and Taxation: An Investigation of Arbitration
in Recent U.S. Tax Conventions, 29 WIS. INT’L L.J. 735, 740–43 (2011) (explaining this
distinction); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice; A Market Incentive
Solution to Regulating the Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and
Fair Play in Online Consumer Arbitration, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 19 (2002) (same).
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arbitrations are conducted by organizations (like the American
Arbitration Association) that administer the arbitration’s procedures,
including arbitrator selection, disclosure, and the arbitration itself.27
They then proceed under the arbitral rules of the administering
tribunal.28 In an ad hoc arbitration, there is no administering
organization, and the arbitration is conducted either based on rules
specified in the parties’ arbitration agreement or by rules agreed to
by consent.29 Ad hoc arbitrations generally allow more procedural
This Article
flexibility, including in the disclosure process.30
therefore focuses initially on the more flexible ad hoc arbitration,
because this makes it easier to explain the general idea of an express
waiver of evident-partiality challenges without bogging down
discussing the details of how a waiver might work under various sets
of arbitral rules.
After the arbitration is concluded, the losing party may raise an
evident-partiality challenge and attempt to persuade a court to vacate
the award by showing facts demonstrating the arbitrator’s evident
partiality.31 The essence of the challenge will be that the arbitrator
had an undisclosed or insufficiently disclosed relationship with a

27. See Ganguly, supra note 26, at 740 n.26 (citing the American Arbitration
Association and London Court of International Arbitration as examples of arbitral
institutions); see also William K. Slate II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a
Difference?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41, 47 (1996) (including the ICC International
Court of Arbitration and the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission as “leading institutions”).
28. Ganguly, supra note 26, at 740.
29. E.g., Slate, supra note 27, at 52–53. The parties may specify free-standing
arbitral rules, such as the UNCITRAL rules, see Ganguly, supra note 26, at 743, or
rules promulgated by an institutional arbitrator, such as the AAA rules. See Slate,
supra note 26, at 52–53 (explaining preference for institutional rather than ad hoc
arbitration). But see Ganguly, supra note 26, at 743 (“Because each institution’s
rules refer to the institution, these rules are not a good choice to use as a model
for ad hoc arbitration.”).
30. See Ganguly, supra note 26, at 740–43 (advantages of an institutional
arbitration include administrative execution and oversight by the tribunal, while
advantages of an ad hoc arbitration are that is cheaper and more flexible); see also
Slate, supra note 27, at 52–53 (arguing that institutional arbitration is superior to ad
hoc arbitration). Many arbitral rule sets allow parties to modify or supersede
procedures by agreement, which would permit use of the waiver procedure described
in this Article. See, e.g., JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES R. 2
(Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Servs., Inc. 2009) (“The Parties may agree on any
procedures not specified herein or in lieu of these Rules . . . . The Party-agreed
procedures shall be enforceable as if contained in these Rules.”).
31. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012). See generally Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating
International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41
STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 78–81 (2005) (describing evident partiality as an avenue for
vacatur of an arbitral award).
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party or their lawyer (e.g., financial, friendly, or familial) that creates
a perception of partiality.32
Judicial evident-partiality challenges can be further divided into
two broad groups: challenges based on claims that an arbitrator
entirely failed to disclose a significant relationship,33 and challenges
based on claims that the arbitrator failed to disclose sufficient facts
about a disclosed relationship to apprise the parties of its true
significance.34 As to the latter sort of challenge, most courts hold that
a party constructively waives evident-partiality challenges based on
relationships or facts it knew about, but did not object to, at the time
of the arbitration.35 Ideally, then, evident-partiality challenges should
be about only relationships that the arbitrator should have disclosed,
but did not disclose, that create the appearance of partiality.36 However,
the content and application of this doctrine of constructive waiver,37
like the parent doctrine of evident partiality, is unclear, and there are
many court cases litigated over whether the arbitrator’s disclosure of
a relationship was sufficient to trigger a waiver.38
When an evident-partiality challenge is raised, there is often
significant discovery and litigation inquiring into the sufficiency of
the arbitrator’s disclosures.39 The trial court that considers the
evident-partiality challenge will decide whether the award should be
vacated after weighing the arbitrator’s duty to disclose, the scope,
32. See, e.g., Karlseng v. Cooke, 346 S.W.3d 85, 96 (Tex. App. 2011) (arbitrator
had social relationship with attorney who represented a party to the arbitration).
33. See, e.g., Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
668 F.3d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Among the circumstances under which the
evident-partiality standard is likely to be met are those in which an arbitrator fails
to disclose a relationship or interest that is strongly suggestive of bias in favor of
one of the parties.”).
34. This distinction becomes important when considering the possible scope of
an express waiver of evident-partiality objections. See infra Parts II.A, III.D-E.
35. See, e.g., JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324
F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a party “which was put on notice of the risk
when it signed the contract [and] chose not to inquire about the backgrounds of the
Committee members either before or during the hearing” waived the right to
challenge the decision based on evident partiality); Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Cos., 137
F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1998) (“While they did not have full knowledge of all the
relationships to which they now object, they did have concerns about [the
arbitrator’s] impartiality and yet chose to have her remain on the panel rather than
spend time and money investigating further until losing the arbitration.”).
36. See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147
(1968) (focusing on an “undisclosed business relationship”).
37. Courts discussing this sort of waiver usually simply refer to it as waiver, see, for
example, JCI Commc’ns, 325 F.3d at 52, but this Article uses the phrase “constructive
waiver” to distinguish it from the express waiver endorsed by this Article.
38. See infra Part I.B.
39. E.g., Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d
278, 285 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (decrying the “[e]xpensive satellite litigation”
over non-disclosures that stems from evident-partiality objections).
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timing, and sufficiency of the disclosure, and the materiality of the
undisclosed information.40 Different courts strike this balance in
different ways, resulting in significant divisions in evident-partiality
doctrine.41 The next part examines the divisions in the application of
evident partiality and the sub-doctrine of constructive waiver, and the
increased pressure placed on these uncertain doctrines by the
Supreme Court’s reduction in alternative avenues to challenge
arbitral awards.
B. Problem: Evident-Partiality Doctrine Is Fractured and Under Increasing
Pressure
Evident partiality-doctrine is currently both uncertain—with courts
widely divided over the content and application of the doctrine—and
under increasing pressure. This means that prior to arbitration
parties may have well-justified fears that any award they win may be
subjected to an extended evident-partiality challenge where the result
is unpredictable, and at best there will be expensive, protracted, and
intrusive litigation to confirm the award.
1.

Disarray in evident-partiality doctrine
Evident-partiality doctrine is currently in disarray, with courts
disagreeing on how to phrase the evident-partiality standard, among
many other subsidiary questions. The confusion over the meaning of
evident partiality stems from the Supreme Court first (and only)
decision attempting to define the term—the 1968 opinion in
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.
There were two leading opinions in Commonwealth Coatings, which
is one source of the current confusion. Justice Black’s “majority”42
opinion adopted an exacting standard of disclosure that allowed
vacatur of an award based on showing a mere “impression of possible
bias” and required arbitrators to “avoid even the appearance of
bias.”43 Justice White, however, wrote a concurrence that advocated
what has been interpreted as a stricter standard requiring not just an

40. See e.g., Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
668 F.3d 60, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2012) (weighing these factors); ANR Coal Co. v.
Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999) (same).
41. See infra Part I.B.
42. Or plurality opinion, depending on whom you ask. See infra note 46.
43. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149–50
(1968) (“We can perceive no way in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process
will be hampered by the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties
any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias. . . . [A]ny tribunal . . .
not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias.”).
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appearance of bias, but a reasonable impression of it.44 His
concurrence has grown in influence as courts (particularly federal
courts) have become friendlier to arbitration.45 Lower courts, both
federal and state, have disagreed over which opinion to follow and
even over whether Justice Black’s opinion is actually a majority
opinion.46 They have also differed widely in their interpretation and
application of the tests laid out by both opinions.47 Thus, while there
is a core of agreement that evident partiality requires a challenger to
prove facts showing some sort of appearance of partiality by the
arbitrator,48 courts do not agree about what formulation of the
evident-partiality doctrine will best accomplish its goals.
Part of the reason for this confusion is that there are conflicting
goals, or policies, behind evident-partiality doctrine. This tension is
reflected in the original Commonwealth Coatings division of opinion
and the deepening, and increasingly complicated, divisions in lower
courts.
Policies supporting extensive disclosure (and a
correspondingly robust judicial role in invalidating awards for
insufficient disclosure) include the basic need for fairness,49 the
44. Id. at 150–52 (White, J., concurring); see Merrick T. Rossein & Jennifer Hope,
Disclosure and Disqualification Standards for Neutral Arbitrators: How Far to Cast the Net
and What Is Sufficient to Vacate Award, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 203, 209 (2007) (“Because
it is generally accepted as a plurality opinion, Commonwealth Coatings has left courts
free to reject ‘evident partiality’ as the broad ‘appearance of bias’ standard in favor
of (what has been interpreted as) Justice White’s more narrow standard requiring
disclosure of relationships such that a ‘reasonable person would . . . conclude that an
arbitrator was partial.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 647 (6th Cir. 2005))).
45. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150–52 (White, J., concurring); Positive
Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 281–83 (5th Cir.
2007) (analyzing Justice White’s concurrence and other courts’ interpretations of the
effect of the concurrence on the majority opinion’s holding); Rogers, supra note 31,
at 79 (“Judicial fallout from this supreme confusion [over the effect of Justice White’s
concurrence on the majority opinion] has been, predictably, even more confused.”).
For a general discussion of the broader trend from judicial hostility towards judicial
friendliness to arbitration, see Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits on
Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547, 553–65 (2005) (describing the change from judicial
hostility to a “new, more generous view” of arbitration).
46. Compare Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 282 (“A majority of circuit
courts have concluded that Justice White’s [concurring] opinion did not lend
majority status to the plurality opinion.”), with Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960
S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. 1997) (criticizing “some lower federal courts” for “treating
Justice Black’s opinion as a mere plurality” and rejecting its “suggestion that ‘evident
partiality’ is met by an ‘appearance of bias’”).
47. See infra notes 61–69 (describing the many judicial points of disagreement
about how to interpret and apply evident-partiality doctrine).
48. See e.g., Perlstadt, supra note 14, at 1997 (noting that “several circuit courts
have adopted a standard somewhere between an ‘appearance of bias’ standard and
the ‘actual bias’ standard that the text of Section 10 [of the FAA] implies”).
49. See, e.g., Barcon Assocs., Inc. v. Tri-Cnty. Asphalt Corp., 430 A.2d 214, 218–19
(N.J. 1981) (noting, in vacating the award that “[a] necessary corollary of the fact
that arbitrators function with the support, encouragement and enforcement power
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desire to have parties prospectively rather than courts retrospectively
evaluate the significance of potential conflicts,50 and the recognition
that the perception of fairness is particularly important in arbitration
precisely because judicial review is so constrained.51
Policies
supporting a more demanding standard for showing evident partiality
include the inefficiency of requiring every arbitrator to disclose her
“complete and unexpurgated business biography,”52 the need for
finality,53 the loss of arbitration’s efficiency advantages if awards are
routinely subject to protracted judicial challenges,54 the desire to
limit sandbagging and trumped-up challenges,55 and the recognition
that not all relationships are sufficiently material to create an
impression of partiality.56

of the state is the requirement that they adhere to high standards of honest, fairness
and impartiality. . . . [I]t is our strongly held view that honest, fair and impartial
arbitration is as important as the finality of arbitration”).
50. See, e.g., TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at 635.
51. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149 (“[W]e should, if anything, be
even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since
the former have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not
subject to appellate review.”). But see id. at 150 (White, J., concurring) (“The Court
does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the standards of judicial
decorum of Article III judges, or indeed of any judges.”).
52. Id. at 151 (White, J., concurring).
53. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476
F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2007) (warning that awarding vacatur even in cases involving
than full disclosure might “seriously jeopardize the finality of arbitration”); Merit Ins.
Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 683 (7th Cir. 1983) (“We do not want to
encourage the losing party to every arbitration to conduct a background
investigation of each of the arbitrators in an effort to uncover evidence of a former
relationship with the adversary. This would only increase the cost and undermine
the finality of arbitration, contrary to the purpose of the U.S. Arbitration Act of
making arbitration a swift, inexpensive, and effective substitute for judicial dispute
resolution.”); see also Rogers, supra note 31, at 117 (“Proponents of broadened
disclosure obligations emphasize the need for ‘impartiality’ or ‘fairness,’ while
opponents emphasize the potential to undercut finality . . . .”).
54. E.g., Merit Ins. Co., 714 F.2d at 683 (describing vacatur as “open[ing] a new
and, we fear, an interminable chapter in the efforts of people who have chosen
arbitration and been disappointed in their choice”).
55. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 285 (“Just as happened here,
losing parties would have an incentive to conduct intensive, after-the-fact
investigations to discover the most trivial of relationships, most of which they likely
would not have objected to if disclosure had been made.”); Nat’l Wrecking Co. v.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 731, 990 F.2d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Parties . . .
cannot stand by during arbitration, withholding certain arguments, then, upon
losing the arbitration, raise such arguments in federal court. We will not tolerate
such sandbagging.”).
56. E.g., Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
668 F.3d 60, 75 (2d Cir. 2012) (encouraging focus on “how strongly th[e]
relationship tends to indicate the possibility of bias in favor of or against one
party, and not on how closely that relationship appears to relate to the facts of
the arbitration”).
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Courts attempting to balance these goals,57 with the confused
guidance of Commonwealth Coatings as their lodestar, have struck the
balance in different ways. Some emphasize keeping arbitrators
honest through searching judicial inquiry into the sufficiency of
disclosures, and a rule requiring arbitrators to err on the side of
disclosure.58 Others emphasize preserving finality, recognizing that
the losing party has different incentives than prior to the arbitration
and will often seize on facts or potential conflicts that seemed (or
would have seemed) insignificant pre-arbitration in hopes of
overturning the award.59 There is some agreement at the core, but at
the margins (and they are fairly wide margins), courts disagree.
The result is that the doctrine of evident partiality is inconsistent
and divided by multiple splits among courts, which the Supreme
Court has not yet resolved or granted certiorari to resolve. The
federal circuits have an acknowledged split over how to phrase the
basic evident-partiality test, specifically a disagreement about whether
evident partiality requires a mere appearance of bias or a more
robust reasonableness standard.60 They also vary on both sides of the
57. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 632–37 (Tex.
1997) (undertaking a broad survey of cases concerning arbitrators’ duty to
disclose and noting that “the competing goals of expertise and impartiality must
be balanced”).
58. See, e.g., New Regency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d
1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting favorably Justice White’s concurrence in
Commonwealth Coatings encouraging arbitrators to err on the side of disclosure); U.S.
Wrestling Fed’n v. Wrestling Div. of AAU, Inc., 605 F.2d 313, 319 (7th Cir. 1979)
(same); see also Stephen K. Huber, The Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit:
Round IV, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 463, 487 (2007) (“Disclosure solves the problem of
the incentive for losing parties to engage in 20-20 hindsight after an arbitration
award by investigating arbitrators’ backgrounds to uncover evidence of conflicts
of interest.”).
59. See, e.g., Hobet Mining, Inc. v. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers, 877 F.
Supp. 1011, 1019 (S.D.W. Va. 1994) (characterizing a post-award challenge as an
“inappropriate attempt to seek a ‘second bite at the apple’ because of dissatisfaction
with the outcome”); Daiichi Haw. Real Estate Corp. v. Lichter, 82 P.3d 411, 434
(Haw. 2003) (refusing to endorse a “wait and see” approach to challenging the
arbitration decision).
60. Compare Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring only
a mere appearance of bias for vacatur of award), and Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1204 (11th Cir. 1982) (same), with Health Servs Mgmt. Corp.
v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz,
750 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1984)) (requiring more than a mere appearance of bias
for vacatur of award), Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir.
1989) (same), and Woods v. Saturn Distrib. Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1996)
(describing the standard as “[a] reasonable impression of bias”). See generally Olson
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d 157, 159 (8th Cir. 1995)
(noting, understatedly, that “there is some uncertainty among the courts of appeals
about the holding of Commonwealth Coatings”); Rossein & Hope, supra note 44, at
212–13 (noting the federal circuit split between “appearance or impression of bias”
and “a more narrow reasonableness standard, requiring ‘more than a mere
appearance of bias’”).
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split in how they apply the standard.61 State courts similarly differ
with one another, and with federal courts (including sometimes
federal courts in the state’s own circuit), about what is necessary to
show evident partiality.62
Beyond the basic disagreement over how to phrase the standard,
numerous other points of disagreement or confusion infect evidentpartiality doctrine. Courts disagree about whether an evidentpartiality challenge can be sustained based on facts not known by the
arbitrator, and correspondingly whether arbitrators have any duty to
search for unknown conflicts such that an award can be vacated if
they fail to discover one.63 Courts disagree about whether there is
independent significance to facts indicating that an arbitrator
intended to mislead through her disclosures.64 They disagree
whether the fact of nondisclosure itself suffices to establish evident
partiality without reference to the materiality of the information.65
61. Compare Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 253 (3d Cir.
2013) (defining evident partiality as a situation in which a reasonable person “would
have to conclude” that an arbitrator was partial to one party to an arbitration), CI
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 51 (1st
Cir. 2003) (same), and Morelite Constr. Corp v. N.Y. City Dist. Council Carpenters
Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984) (same), with Positive Software
Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 2007)
(advocating a “reasonable impression of bias” standard that is “interpreted practically
rather than with utmost rigor”), Dow Corning Corp. v. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 335
F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2003) (defining evident partiality as a situation where a
reasonable person “could assume” that the arbitrator had improper motives (quoting
ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 501 (4th Cir. 1999))), and
Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1339
(11th Cir. 2002) (defining evident partiality as information which “would lead” a
reasonable person to believe that a potential conflict exists).
62. See, e.g., Amoco D.T. Co. v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 343 S.W.3d 837, 842–44
(Tex. App. 2011) (explicitly rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of “evident
partiality” in Positive Software Solutions in favor of the Texas Supreme Court’s
interpretation in TUCO).
63. Compare Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1049 (holding that an award may be vacated for
nondisclosure if those facts create a “reasonable impression of partiality” even where
such facts are unknown to the arbitrator), with Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d
680, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[W]e explicitly hold that there is no duty on an arbitrator
to make any such investigation.”), and Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM
Investor Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that there is
no independent duty to investigate under the FAA where the arbitrator is unaware of
the undisclosed facts).
64. Compare Craig v. Barber, 524 So. 2d 974, 978 (Miss. 1988) (“Evident partiality
has objective and subjective components.”), with Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v.
Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that
“subjective good faith is not the test”).
65. Compare Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1997)
(“We emphasize that this evident partiality is established from the nondisclosure itself,
regardless of whether the nondisclosed information necessarily establishes partiality
or bias.”), with Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
668 F.3d 60, 77 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The nondisclosure does not by itself constitute
evident partiality.”).
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They also disagree about what kind of relationship between arbitrator
and party or counsel is sufficiently material or significant to show
evident partiality.66
In addition to the primary uncertainty over what the evidentpartiality standard should be, there is also significant uncertainty
about the ancillary doctrine of constructive waiver. That is, they
disagree about how much knowledge is sufficient to put a party “on
notice” of a relationship such that any post-award evident partiality
objection based on that relationship will be constructively waived.67
Courts generally agree that a party can waive an evident-partiality
objection by failing to object to a conflict that the arbitrator
disclosed, but they differ widely as to what counts as “knowing” about
the relationship. They take different positions about how much
information a party must have about a potential conflict before it will
constructively waive judicial challenge based on that conflict by
proceeding with the arbitration without objecting.68 This means that
after the arbitration, a winning party may face a challenge based on a
relationship that was in some way disclosed before the arbitration.
The winning party may then have to defend against arguments that the
arbitrator failed to disclose sufficient details about the relationship to
apprise the losing party of its significance or materiality.69
66. See Lee Korland, Comment, What An Arbitrator Should Investigate and Disclose:
Proposing a New Test for Evident Partiality Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 815, 826–27 (2003) (noting that “courts have also struggled to generate
guidelines for determining what types of relationships and how proximate
connections must be to warrant vacating an arbitration award”).
67. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that the waiver doctrine applies where a party has constructive
knowledge of a potential conflict, yet fails to object prior to the arbitration decision).
68. Compare Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1359 (6th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the successful party may not rely on the failure to object for bias unless
“[a]ll the facts now argued as to [the] alleged bias were known . . . at the time the
joint committee heard their grievances” (alterations in original) (quoting Early v. E.
Transfer, 699 F.2d 552, 558 (1st Cir. 1983))), with JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a party “which
was put on notice of the risk when it signed the contract [and] chose not to inquire
about the backgrounds of the Committee members either before or during the
hearing” waived the right to challenge the decision based on evident partiality), and
Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Cos., Inc., 137 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1998) (“While they did
not have full knowledge of all the relationships to which they now object, they did
have concerns about [the arbitrator’s] impartiality and yet chose to have her
remain on the panel rather than spend time and money investigating further until
losing the arbitration.”).
69. See, e.g., Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, Inc., 376 S.W.3d
358, 362–63 (Tex. App. 2012) (considering a losing party’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the details of the relationships the arbitrator disclosed); Applied Indus.
Materials Corp. v. Ovular Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir.
2007) (same); ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 496 (4th Cir.
1999) (same).
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Given the longstanding, wide-ranging, and intractable judicial
division over evident-partiality doctrine, scholars have also weighed
in, cataloging these divisions and attempting to resolve them by
rationalizing or reforming the doctrine.70 Proposals have included a
reasonableness standard requiring more than a mere appearance of
bias,71 a standard requiring disclosure of “any facts that would lead a
person to entertain a reasonable doubt of the arbitrator’s
neutrality,”72 and a complete restructuring of the doctrine to
abandon “value-laden, yet indeterminate terms such as ‘impartial’ or
‘independent.’”73 None of these proposals, however, has carried the
day in the courts, and so the meaning of evident partiality remains in
judicial and theoretical disarray.74 While there have been efforts to
convince the U.S. Supreme Court to take up a case to resolve these
confusions,75 the Court has so far declined.

70. See, e.g., David J. Branson, American Party-Appointed Arbitrators—Not the Three
Monkeys, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2004) (suggesting a balance between the
international arbitration model of appointing “sympathetic” arbitrators and the
American arbitration model of appointing “partisan” arbitrators); Glick, supra note
24, at 100 (proposing the adoption of a “basic standard of pre-arbitration disclosure”
modeled after the ABA/AAA code of ethics); David Allen Larson, Conflicts of Interest
and Disclosures: Are We Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill?, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 879
(2008) (analyzing how Federal Arbitration Act standards can be applied when a
neutral arbitrator fails to make an adequate disclosure of evident partiality); David J.
McLean & Sean-Patrick Wilson, Is Three a Crowd? Neutrality, Partiality and Partisanship
in the Context of Tripartite Arbitrations, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL L.J. 167, 176–77 (2008)
(addressing factors parties should consider when examining the role of neutral and
party-appointed arbitrators); Rogers, supra note 31 (suggesting that current
standards governing arbitrator conduct are insufficient and arbitral institutions
should adopt and enforce a code of ethics against arbitrators); Rossein & Hope,
supra note 44 (advocating a shift from onerous disclosure requirements to a
reasonableness standard for disclosure); Kirill Kan, Note, The Importance of FINRA’s
Arbitrator Selection Process and Clarity in the “Evident Partiality” Standard in the Wake of
Morgan Keegan, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167 (2012) (suggesting mechanisms
such as a screening process that FINRA could implement to eliminate arbitrators
who have presided over similar product or firm cases); Korland, supra note 66
(proposing that a party able to demonstrate that an arbitrator “made a reasonable
investigation of potential conflicts” would have an affirmative defense to preserve an
arbitral award); Kathryn A. Windsor, Comment, Defining Arbitrator Evident Partiality:
The Catch-22 of Commercial Litigation Disputes, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 191 (2009)
(indicating that an arbitrator should have an affirmative duty to investigate any
potential conflicts before the arbitration to avoid lengthy processes to examining the
adequacy of the disclosure).
71. Rossein & Hope, supra note 44, at 253–55.
72. Glick, supra note 24, at 101.
73. Rogers, supra note 31, at 81.
74. See, e.g., McLean & Wilson, supra note 70, at 176–77 (“Much to the frustration
of arbitrators and practitioners everywhere, the vague ‘impression of possible bias’
test that the Court adopted in Commonwealth Coatings has been found difficult to
define in practice.”).
75. E.g., Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d
278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1114 (2007).
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In short, evident-partiality doctrine is quite confused, as courts and
scholars acknowledge.76 As a result, a party preparing to arbitrate
faces serious uncertainty about how courts might resolve an evidentpartiality challenge to the arbitral award, with the outcome of the
challenge depending heavily on the jurisdiction where it is heard, as
well as on the competence of the trial court in understanding and
applying the confused body of evident-partiality law.77
2.

Increased pressure on fractured evident-partiality doctrine
While evident-partiality doctrine has long been divided, the
narrowing or elimination of alternative avenues to challenge arbitral
awards has placed increased pressure on the fractures in the doctrine.
As alternative avenues narrow or disappear, losing parties increasingly
focus on evident partiality (and its uncertainty) as their best hope for
challenging undesired results.78
76. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 251–54 (3d
Cir. 2013) (noting the “confusion” stemming from the Commonwealth Coatings
decision and choosing to follow a line of cases applying a “reasonable person”
standard); Montez v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 260 F.3d 980, 983 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The
absence of a consensus on the meaning of evident partiality is evidenced by the
approaches adopted by the different circuits.”).
77. Some of this uncertainty might be reduced by the inclusion of venue
provisions in parties’ arbitration agreements that specify a court or jurisdiction in
which any challenge to an arbitral award must be heard. Not all (or even most)
agreements have venue provisions. Without a venue provision, confirmation/vacatur
proceedings can be brought anywhere venue is otherwise proper under the federal
rules. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 199–200,
202–04 (2000) (holding that the FAA’s venue provisions are permissive; therefore, a
subsequent motion can be brought in the district where award was given or in any
district according to the federal venue state). Thus, prearbitration, parties cannot
know which federal court, in what circuit, with which evident-partiality standard, will
adjudicate award confirmation.
Furthermore, in many
situations,
confirmation/vacatur proceedings can be brought in state court with no possibility
of removal. See, e.g., Virgin Islands Hous. Auth. v. Coastal Gen. Constr. Servs. Corp.,
27 F.3d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Arbitration Act does not supply federal
jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist.”); Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense
of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 101, 169 (2002) (“[W]hile the ‘primary purpose’ of the FAA was to
make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court, a secondary purpose was
to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state court.”). Thus, parties also face
uncertainty about the version of the evident-partiality standard that will be applied to
their award when state and federal courts in a single state apply different versions of
the evident-partiality doctrine. Compare Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 283
(adopting more lenient standard that overlooks “a trivial or insubstantial prior
relationship” and interprets the “‘reasonable impression of bias’ standard . . .
practically rather than with utmost rigor”), with Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960
S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1997) (adopting a stricter standard that allows evident
partiality to be established “from the nondisclosure itself, regardless of whether the
nondisclosed information necessarily establishes partiality”).
78. See, e.g., Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 65 SMU L. REV. 247, 252
(2012) (noting evident partiality-based motions to vacate arbitration awards have
been rising in recent years); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability
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Courts, led by the U.S. Supreme Court, have steadily reduced other
avenues to challenge arbitral awards.79 Most notably, the Supreme
Court recently cast severe doubt on, and nearly eliminated, the
judicially-crafted doctrine allowing vacatur of an award based on the
“manifest disregard” of facts or law by the arbitral panel.80 Manifest
disregard allowed overturning arbitration decisions on substantive
grounds, though the standard was high.81 But, in Hall Street
Associates v. Mattel,82 the Court held that parties may not
contractually agree to expand the judicial scope of review of
arbitration awards beyond that provided in the FAA.83 In doing
so, the opinion casts serious doubt on the viability of the
judicially-crafted “manifest disregard” ground for challenging an
arbitral award.84

Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1420, 1422 (2008) (“Because the Supreme Court has embraced arbitration much
more firmly than have some other parts of the judicial system, there is a sort of
hydraulic pressure in the system that will seek release through whatever channel still
exists for invalidating, or at least limiting, arbitration agreements.”).
79. See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (contracting
the manifest disregard doctrine as grounds for vacatur); Taylor v. Univ. of
Phoenix/Apollo Grp., 487 F. App’x 942 (5th Cir. 2012) (requiring a nexus between
the alleged fraud and the arbitrator’s decisionnot just the existence of fraudto
justify vacatur under the FAA); Lessin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
481 F.3d 813, 819–20 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (requiring that the objecting party show it was
deprived of a fundamentally fair hearing for vacatur under the FAA). The decisions
narrowing avenues to challenge arbitral awards are part of a broader trend led by the
Supreme Court to restrict attempts to escape or avoid arbitration. See, e.g., Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (enforcing class-arbitration
waiver); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (same); see also
Hal S. Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual
Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187, 1222 (2013)
(highlighting the current Supreme Court’s “consistent decisions in favor of the
FAA’s broad pro-arbitration policy”).
80. Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584–85 (2008).
81. See e.g., Kurke v. Oscar Gruss and Son, Inc., 454 F.3d 350, 354 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (emphasizing that manifest disregard is a demanding standard requiring proof
that arbitrators blatantly disregarded facts or law applicable to the case); Stark v.
Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 799, 802 (8th Cir. 2004)
(same); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); Bowen v.
Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001) (same).
82. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
83. Id. at 586.
84. See, e.g., MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A. Bales, Much Ado About Nothing: The
Future of Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 424–33 (2010)
(describing the circuit split concerning whether manifest disregard lives after Hall
Street and suggesting that even though the doctrine survives, it remains unworkable
and should be replaced); Karen A. Lorang, Comment, Mitigating Arbitration’s
Externalities: A Call for Tailored Judicial Review, 59 UCLA L. REV. 218, 228–29 (2011)
(“The Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have read Hall Street to completely
eliminate judicially created grounds for vacatur, including manifest disregard. In
contrast, the Second, Seventh, and Ninth (and perhaps the Tenth) Circuits have
held that the doctrine survives.” (footnotes omitted)).
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In addition to the decline of manifest disregard, other decisions
have tightened statutory avenues for vacatur other than evident
partiality.85 Disappointed losing parties are left with fewer options,
and in many jurisdictions, no options at all, to challenge awards
based on substantive disagreement with the decision.86 At the same
time, evident-partiality doctrine has not yet been subjected to this
same sort of clarification and constriction by the Supreme Court, and
instead is in great disarray.87 These pressures appear to be resulting
in an increasing number of evident partiality challenges in court.88
Because of the reduction in other avenues to challenge arbitral
awards, and the uncertainty about the content and application of the
doctrine of evident partiality, losing parties have a strong incentive to
raise evident-partiality challenges to awards in hopes of uncovering
undisclosed relationships or additional facts about disclosed

85. See, e.g., Stanley A. Leasure, Vacatur of Arbitration Awards: The Poor Loser
Problem or Loser Pays?, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 489, 506–09 (2007) (discussing
the available grounds for vacatur under the FAA, and noting that “federal courts
have taken a narrow view in interpreting ‘undue means,’” “most courts have been
reluctant to vacate an arbitration award on the statutory basis of fraud,” and that
vacatur due to arbitrator misconduct is typically only possible upon clear proof of
“bad faith or gross error”); see also Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur
After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1108–16 (2009) (detailing the increasing
difficulty of successfully vacating an award under statutory and non-statutory grounds
for vacatur).
86. The trend towards limiting ways to challenge arbitral awards has become
more common: courts have slowly eliminated or narrowed doctrines that held that
parties could not waive access to a judicial forum to pursue certain types of claims.
See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 78, at 1431–32 (tracing expansion of arbitration to include
statutory causes of action). Together, these trends comprise a broader movement of
increasing judicial friendliness towards arbitration, or sweeping more claims into
arbitration and reducing ways to challenge the results); David Horton, Arbitration and
Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights Doctrine, 60 KAN. L. REV. 723, 724–25
(2012) (explaining and critiquing the increased burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate
that “they cannot vindicate their federal statutory rights in arbitration” before
seeking judicial review); see also, Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (reading the FAA, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, to
embody “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary”); Bruhl, supra note 78, at
1426–29 (describing the Supreme Court’s transformation of the FAA into “the
broadly sweeping, muscular statute we know today”); Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme
Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. L. REV. 91, 93–94
(2012) (discussing the judiciary’s shift from hostility to arbitration towards a “judicial
policy favoring arbitration”).
87. See supra Part I.B.
88. Westlaw searches for all cases mentioning the phrase “evident partiality (a
crude way to measure how often the issue is litigated) turn up 3,517 cases overall. Of
these, 1,371 were in the 2000s, as compared to 736 in the 1990s and 398 in the
1980s—roughly doubling every decade.
Moreover, the trend seems to be
accelerating: in the three years from 2010-2013, there were 604 such cases, which is
on pace to reach over 2000 cases by the conclusion of the decade.
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relationships.89 Winning parties face the prospect of litigation to
preserve the award that will be costly and protracted at best.90 At
worst, an evident-partiality challenge may result in invalidation of the
award, even in circumstances where many other courts would have
confirmed it. Losing parties face the long-shot prospect of spending
a great deal of time and money to try to escape an award. Moreover,
arbitrators face the prospect of time-consuming and unpleasant
investigations into their dealings and background, which may have a
broader chilling effect on arbitrators’ willingness to serve.91 Further,
this effect will be most pronounced for arbitrators with the most
expertise in the area of the dispute, because these arbitrators will be
more likely to have material connections in the area or industry. This
means that the “best” (defined as most experienced) arbitrators will
be the ones most dissuaded from serving.92
In short, the uncertainty and division over evident partiality
presents a serious practical problem for parties to arbitrations and for
arbitrators. Courts and scholars have recognized this confusion, but
they have yet to provide a satisfying and reassuring resolution.93
Instead of offering another attempt to rationalize or conform the
evident-partiality doctrine, this Article suggests an alternative
approach that should have great practical attractiveness to parties
and does have sound theoretical justifications. Parties can make
89. See Pryor, supra note 78, at 252 (noting that challenging the adequacy of
arbitrator disclosures is the most popular means for challenging arbitrator partiality).
90. See, e.g., Eric J. Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and Unconscionability,
19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 761, 780–81 (2003) (“Because the FAA specifically allows federal
court challenges to arbitration awards where the arbitrator was not impartial, any
actual or apparent bias leads to costly litigation—the very result both parties are
seeking to avoid. An arbitration award tainted by evident partiality will be overturned
in post-award litigation, further increasing dispute resolution costs to the parties.”
(footnote omitted)). Costs can include litigation and discovery in the trial court
as well as one or more rounds of appellate litigation to overturn the initial
judicial ruling.
91. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476
F.3d 278, 285–86 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that holding arbitrators to a “higher
ethical standard than federal Article III judges” would deter the “best lawyers and
professionals” from serving as arbitrators, thus eliminating the expertise demanded
in arbitrations).
92. Id. at 285–86 (“Arbitration would lose the benefit of specialized knowledge,
because the best lawyers and professionals, who normally have the longest lists of
potential connections to disclose, have no need to risk blemishes on their
reputations from post-arbitration lawsuits attacking them as biased.”).
93. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir.
2013) (stating that “[t]he first order of business is to define ‘evident partiality’ under
the Federal Arbitration Act” which is plagued with “confusion”); Edward Brunet,
Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 97–98 (1992) (“The
Commonwealth Coatings decision is confusing. . . . Lower courts have struggled
with the ‘less than clear [evident partiality] standard’ of Commonwealth Coatings.”
(footnote omitted)).
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express waivers of evident-partiality objections before arbitration
begins, which courts can and should enforce, to cut off evidentpartiality objections in ensuing litigation to confirm the award. In
the next part, I explain how express waivers of evident-partiality
objections would work, and argue for their practical advantages and
theoretical justifications.
II. EXPRESS WAIVERS OF EVIDENT-PARTIALITY CHALLENGES
A. Proposal and Procedure for Express Prearbitration Waivers of EvidentPartiality Challenges
The basic idea is straightforward: after the arbitrators have made
disclosures, and the parties have been given the opportunity to ask
follow-up questions,94 the parties can agree to an express, binding
waiver of evident-partiality challenges in any ensuing judicial
proceeding to confirm or vacate the award.95 The details of the
94. See, e.g., Stone v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d 435, 440–41 (E.D. Pa.
2012) (finding that FINRA instructed its arbitrator to “disclose [a] potential conflict
as broadly as you can and then invite . . . questions” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); McKinney Drilling Co. v. Mach I Ltd. P’ship, 359 A.2d 100, 102 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1976) (evaluating a party’s objection to an AAA arbitrator, the AAA’s
subsequent decision to overrule the objection, and the party’s request for and the
court’s granting of an order permitting the parties to ask questions of the arbitrator
concerning a prior relationship); Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy,
Inc., 376 S.W.3d 358, 372 (Tex. App. 2012) (holding that “a few basic and obvious
questions posed to [the arbitrator] when the disclosure was received would have
adduced the very information that they are now complaining about”).
95. The express-waiver idea is not analyzed at any length in either academic
literature or case law. The idea of a waiver is mentioned in one article
recommending new guidelines for arbitrator disclosures, but the focus in that article
(as in other articles) is on rethinking or adjusting the disclosure standard. Glick,
supra note 24, at 101 (“If these disclosures are made at the time of appointment,
parties may waive objections to the appearance of bias, request more
information, . . . or challenge the arbitrator for cause. This should eliminate many
post-arbitration challenges for arbitrator nondisclosure.”). Another article addresses
and endorses the idea of parties agreeing to limit judicial review and notes
specifically that such “exclusion agreements” are enforceable under British law, but
that “this trend is yet to cross the Atlantic into the United States.” Kenneth M.
Curtin, An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial Review of
Arbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 337, 357–60 (2000). There is also some
indication in court decisions that arbitral panels are attempting to use such waivers
in practice, but there are no decisions specifically analyzing the enforceability of such
a waiver. See, e.g., Ponderosa Pine Energy, 376 S.W.3d at 362 (“Additionally, at the
urging of [arbitrator] Justice Baker, the order contained a waiver of conflicts
provision in which the parties and the arbitrators confirmed that they . . . knowingly
waive any and all conflicts of interest and/or potential conflicts of interest . . . .”); see
also Cozzolino v. Cozzolino, No. L-10417-10, 2012 WL 6097090, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Dec. 10, 2012) (holding that the parties’ signature to “the pre-hearing
arbitration order, which stated that ‘[t]he parties waive any and all rights of appeal
or to in any way challenge the Arbitrator’s decision, which shall be conclusive and final in
all respect[s]” constituted a waiver of appeal (alterations in original) (emphasis
added)). Nor are there any judicial decisions specifically considering the
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waiver and waiver process may vary based on the procedures the
parties have agreed to (in an ad hoc arbitration), or on the governing
arbitral rules. The basic proposal is that arbitrators and parties can
and should use express waivers to cut off some or all judicial evidentpartiality challenges.
Procedurally, the waiver process would take place at the conclusion
of the arbitral disclosure process, but before the beginning of the
hearing.96 The waiver could take several forms. The parties
themselves could each sign a joint filing indicating that they waive
any evident-partiality objection. Or, the arbitrators might issue a
prehearing order declaring that the parties have confirmed they have
no objections based on evident partiality, and have the parties sign
this order to demonstrate their consent to the waiver.97 In a “live”
arbitration, the arbitrators might simply ask the parties on the record
whether they agree to waive any objections based on evident
partiality, and secure verbal responses for the transcript.
In general, implementing the waiver through the parties’ express
written consent is more desirable because it more firmly grounds the
waiver (like the arbitration itself) in the mutual written agreement
(contract) of the parties.98 Although the formality of the waiver
perhaps should not matter,99 a court might well disagree. Instead, a
court may be more likely to enforce a signed party waiver as opposed
to a mere verbal indication in the transcript of proceedings before

enforceability of such a waiver in the evident-partiality context. But see
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 14 F.3d 818, 822–23 (2d Cir.
1994) (upholding arbitral clause that limited judicial review to an “arbitrary and
capricious” standard).
96. See Rossein and Hope, supra note 44, at 204–06 (explaining arbitrators’
disclosure obligations and how the arbitration disclosure process works).
97. See, e.g., Cozzolino, 2012 WL 6097090, at *6 (upholding a prehearing
arbitration order drafted by the plaintiff’s attorney stating that the parties waive their
rights to appeal or challenge the arbitrator’s decision). The arbitrators probably
could not and should not simply issue an order stating that evident-partiality
challenges will be waived because parties have not raised any objections. Such a
waiver would likely be unenforceable because it would be untethered from the
principle of party consent that is the root of the theoretical justification for enforcing
express waivers, as well as the theoretical justification for binding arbitration in
general. Instead, the case would likely be analyzed as a constructive-waiver case,
which is exactly what the express-waiver proposal seeks to give parties a way to avoid.
See ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 496–502 (4th Cir. 1999)
(ignoring institutional arbitrator’s pre-arbitration opinion that an evidentpartiality challenge to a particular, disclosed relationship would be waived); see
also infra Part II.C.
98. See infra Part III.C (discussing the importance of the parties’ consent in
providing the theoretical justification for enforcing the waiver).
99. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (“[T]he
informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and
increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”).
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the panel, or (especially) a unilateral statement by the arbitrator(s)
that the parties agreed to a waiver.100 In particular, since the
jurisprudence upholding arbitration agreements focuses not just on
the parties’ consent, but on the parties’ contract,101 the more the
waiver looks like a contract, the likelier it is that courts would be
untroubled about enforcing it. 102
As to the scope of the waiver, it could take narrower or broader
forms. Parties could narrowly agree to waive an evident-partiality
objection only as to relationships revealed in the arbitrator’s
disclosures.103 Alternatively, parties could broadly agree to waive all
evident-partiality objections, including any based on relationships
completely undisclosed by the arbitrator. While both forms of waiver
might be enforceable, the narrower form will likely be more attractive
to parties, and more likely to be enforced by courts. It is less likely
and more problematic that parties would want to forego evidentpartiality objections based on relationships that the arbitrator entirely
failed to disclose, or especially actively concealed.104 Further, courts
would likely be more reluctant to enforce such a waiver, even if the
parties’ consent was plain, when a party was entirely unaware of a
potentially relevant relationship. This Article therefore focuses
primarily on the practical attractions and theoretical justifications for
this narrower form of waiver.105

100. See, e.g., ANR Coal Co., 173 F.3d at 496–502 (analyzing waiver based on
constructive waiver doctrine when there was not a signed party writing confirming
the waiver).
101. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
570 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that “arbitration is a creature of
contract”); infra Part III.C (discussing the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration
jurisprudence and its emphasis on enforcing the parties’ contract).
102. While it would be necessary to secure the parties’ express consent to the
waiver, arbitrators might persuade the parties to agree to the waiver by asking the
parties to either raise a challenge or agree to a waiver before the arbitration can
proceed. Indeed, it is the arbitrator’s duty to “conduct the arbitration process so as
to advance the fair and efficient resolution of the matters submitted for decision.”
THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon I(F). Of
course, “an arbitrator should not exert pressure on any party to settle or to utilize
other dispute resolution processes.” Id. at Canon IV(F). However, the Code of Ethics
explicitly provides “it is not improper for an arbitrator to suggest . . . other dispute
resolution processes.” Id. While caution would be necessary, arbitrators could at
least encourage parties to agree to waive partiality objections.
103. See infra Part III.D (addressing the argument that this narrow type of waiver
would not do much to reduce collateral evident-partiality litigation).
104. See id. (considering the implications and analysis of a broader, blanket waiver of
evident-partiality challenges, and recommending against such an approach).
105. See id. (discussing the potential for flexibility in the scope of the waiver, based
on the parties’ mutual agreement).
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B. Express Waivers of Evident-Partiality Challenges Will Be of Great
Practical Use and Attractiveness to Parties to Arbitrations.
Express waivers of evident-partiality challenges based on
relationships somehow disclosed (i.e., “narrow” waivers) would have
significant usefulness and value to parties. They would eliminate
challenges to a relationship disclosed by the arbitrator based on
arguments that the arbitrator failed to provide enough details of the
relationship or sufficiently disclose facts indicating its materiality.106
It would require parties to speak up or hold their peace—i.e., object,
or waive— as to any problems they have with relationships that have
been disclosed by the arbitrator, balancing their desire to complete
arbitration and the general perceived desirability of the panel against
any concerns they might have based on the disclosures. It would
foreclose collateral litigation during the award-confirmation process
over whether the objecting party constructively waived the objection,
and dispel uncertainty due to courts’ division over what constitutes a
constructive waiver.107 Instead, the reviewing court could simply
review the arbitrator’s disclosure and the express waiver, and if the
relationship that is the basis of the evident partiality challenge is one
that was present in the arbitrator’s disclosure, it can reject the
evident-partiality challenge without more inquiry. Instead of being
adrift in the “murky waters” of evident-partiality doctrine,108 parties
will be in the clear safe harbor of mutual waiver.109
106. These sorts of challenges are a fairly common type of evident-partiality
litigation. See, e.g., Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, Inc., 376 S.W.3d
358, 361 (Tex. App. 2012) (losing party challenged the sufficiency of the arbitrator’s
disclosure of details about the challenged relationship); see also Applied Indus.
Materials Corp. v. Ovular Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 136, 139 (2d
Cir. 2007) (same); ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 496 (4th
Cir. 1999) (same); Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 65 SMU L. REV. 247, 252
(2012) (“The most popular means of proving evident partiality is to challenge the
adequacy of the disclosures made by the arbitrator prior to confirmation.”).
107. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that the waiver doctrine applies where a party has constructive
knowledge of a potential conflict, yet fails to object prior to the arbitration decision);
JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir.
2003) (concluding that a party waived its evident partiality complaint when it “was
put on notice of the risk” when it signed a contract providing for an industryrepresented arbitration panel and “chose not to inquire about the backgrounds of
the Committee members either before or during the hearing”); see also supra notes
67–69 and accompanying text (examining courts’ divisions over the doctrine of
constructive waiver).
108. Perlstadt, supra note 14, at 1997 (“In navigating these murky waters, several
circuit courts have adopted a standard [of evident partiality] somewhere between an
‘appearance of bias’ standard and the ‘actual bias’ standard . . . .”).
109. Of course, the parties after the fact will have very different degrees of
happiness about being in that safe harbor, but this is a “feature, not a bug.” See
generally John A. Robertson, “Paying the Alligator”: Precommitment in Law, Bioethics, and
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An express waiver will allow the parties, ex ante, to greatly reduce
the potential for costly and time-consuming post-award litigation
before the award is finally confirmed. Arbitrators can be reassured
that if they mention a relationship in their disclosure, and truthfully
answer any follow-up questions, they will not be subjected to a postaward investigation designed to make them look at best professionally
negligent and at worst dishonest and partial.110
Further, there is actually a significant practical likelihood that
parties would agree to such a waiver. In general, before arbitration,
the parties have significantly different incentives than afterwards,
when the losing party will usually want to overturn the award by any
means available.111 After a loss, facts or potential conflicts that were
insignificant and untroubling before the arbitration began become
reeds to clutch in hopes of overturning the award.112 Conversely,
before an arbitration hearing, a party will have a much stronger
incentive to forego post-award collateral challenges for the sake of
efficiency, and for the sake of allowing the arbitration to proceed.113
This is especially true as to disclosed relationships about which the
party might not have all the details, but about which it feels relatively
untroubled at the time the arbitration begins; that is, relationships
covered by the narrower type of waiver mentioned above.114
Thus, the waiver would operate to foreclose challenges in precisely
the cases where cutting off challenges is most desirable. In other
words, a party will more likely agree to the waiver in cases when, ex
ante, it has fewer “real” concerns about a relationship disclosed by
the arbitrator before the arbitration. Waivers will thus greatly reduce
challenges that are manufactured after the arbitration by a party that

Constitutions, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1729, 1729–38 (2003) (analyzing the advantages and
limits of precommitment behavior—whose “hallmark” is “the intention to restrict
future options”—across a variety of legal disciplines); see also infra notes 115–118, 148
and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476
F.3d 278, 285–86 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting the potential for chilling effects on
arbitrators from routine judicial evident-partiality challenges).
111. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 59, at 487 (describing the ex post “incentive for
losing parties to engage in 20-20 hindsight after an arbitration award by investigating
arbitrators’ backgrounds to uncover evidence of conflicts of interest”).
112. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 285 (“Just as happened here,
losing parties would have an incentive to conduct intensive, after-the-fact
investigations to discover the most trivial of relationships, most of which they likely
would not have objected to if disclosure had been made.”).
113. See generally Reuben, supra note 15, at 962–64 (suggesting that arbitration’s
strengths as a flexible, efficient alternative to dispute resolution focused on finality
may contribute to arbitration’s drawbacks as a private process that leads parties to
forego some “public law rights”).
114. See supra Part III.A.
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is casting about for a way to escape an undesirable award.115 This
solution will reduce, if not eliminate, the common practice of a
party keeping an evident-partiality challenge in its back pocket for
later judicial proceedings rather than raising or investigating it
further before the arbitration begins.116 Conversely, a party with
legitimate qualms about a disclosed relationship will be highly
motivated to ask any follow-up questions it has before agreeing to a
waiver, to find out whether there is anything to be truly concerned
about before it proceeds.
Thus, using narrow express waivers of evident-partiality challenges
will be an effective way to cull the most undesirable and inefficient
evident-partiality challenges from the judicial system.117 Parties will
be spared having to await a court decision about whether the
relationship was significant, whether additional details about the
relationship were necessary to accurately convey its significance,
whether it matters if the arbitrator knew all the details, and whether
the relationship in all of its detail would create a mere appearance or
a reasonable impression of bias. These are all questions whose
resolution would be uncertain because of the fractures and divisions
of evident-partiality doctrine.118
Further, parties may have other incentives to agree to such a
waiver. The arbitrators might make moving forward with the
arbitration conditional on agreement to a waiver. Parties would be
placed under pressure to either agree to the waiver, ask any further
questions about the arbitrator’s disclosures it desires, challenge the
arbitrator (with the delay and risk119 that entails), or go through the
trouble, time, and expense of finding a different panel. Parties might
115. See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 284–85 (holding that an
undisclosed “slender connection” between the arbitrator and one of the parties in
the case did not warrant dismissal of the award).
116. See, e.g., id.; Nat’l Wrecking Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 731, 990 F.2d
957, 960 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Parties . . . cannot stand by during arbitration, withholding
certain arguments, then, upon losing the arbitration, raise such arguments in federal
court. We will not tolerate such sandbagging.”).
117. See Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 285 (criticizing evident-partiality
challenges in which the challenger likely would not have found the information
objectionable if it had asked questions to elicit it).
118. See supra Part II.B (detailing the current judicial division on each of these points).
119. See ANR Coal Co., Inc. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 496 (4th Cir.
1999) (noting party’s argument that it had declined to raise a challenge because “a
failed challenge could potentially offend the ‘neutral’ arbitrator as a challenge to his
integrity.”; see also John G. Keolit & John S. Jiernan, THE LITIGATION MANUAL:
PRETRIAL 19 (ABA 1999) (“If you fail, after having challenged a judge on the basis of
bias, the judge would indeed need to be a saint not to harbor some abiding ill
will. . . . [S]urely the recusal motion is a risky way of achieving an uncertain
end.”); Omar Little, The Wire, Lessons (HBO 2002) (“You come at the king, you
best not miss.”).
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choose to agree to such a waiver as a precommitment strategy to
signal to their opponent (or themselves) their confidence or
seriousness about winning the arbitration.120
In sum, the ex ante pressures, incentives, and circumstances parties
face will often induce them to agree to a waiver, which is enforceable
ex post after the losing party’s incentives have changed and the party
looks for a way to escape the award. The parties will thus be spared
time and expense litigating evident partiality in an awardconfirmation proceeding. In addition, courts will be spared having to
preside over proceedings that amount to an extended postmortem
on the arbitral disclosure process.121 At a minimum, courts may be
able to dispose of these challenges more quickly, a goal that courts
on different sides of the evident partiality division have proclaimed
they share.122
C. Enforcing Express Waivers Is Theoretically Consistent With Arbitration’s
Fundamental Policies
Express-partiality waivers are not only practically attractive, but
there is a strong theoretical basis for courts enforcing them rooted in
the underlying policies supporting arbitration itself.
The
fundamental theoretical policy justification for arbitration is that it
allows parties to consensually choose an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism that is more efficient, flexible, and final than court
proceedings.123 While the efficiency of arbitration is disputed,124 it is
clear that the fundamental justification for enforcing arbitration
agreements is that parties may choose arbitration for themselves
based on that belief.125 At the most basic level, the essential
120. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 109, at 1731 (“Cortés burned his boats in
Mexico to prevent his or his soldiers own cowardice at the same time that he signaled
to the Aztecs that his men would not back down.”).
121. Positive Software Solutions, 476 F.3d at 285.
122. Compare id. (justifying its approach to evident partiality on the grounds of not
wanting to encourage judicial evident-partiality challenges), with Burlington N. R.R.
v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 637 (Tex. 1997) (justifying its full-disclosure/errtowards-disclosure approach on the grounds that it will keep courts from having to
decide disclosure challenges).
123. E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (“The
point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for
efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute. . . . And the
informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and
increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”).
124. See supra note 10 (contrasting the perceived benefits and perceived pitfalls of
arbitration to show that there is a lack of consensus on arbitration’s appeal).
125. See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (“The overarching purpose of the
FAA . . .is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their
terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010) (“In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the
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justification for arbitration is consent—the parties’ agreement to
resolve their disputes in an arbitral forum.126 The corollary of this
policy is that, once the parties have chosen to arbitrate, they can and
should be bound by that choice, and its accompanying consequence
of foregoing the process and procedure of a judicial forum.127
Further, as recent Supreme Court decisions have made clear, this
principle of agreement/consent extends to the enforcement of party
agreements about certain procedural rights or vehicles in the
arbitration, most notably class arbitration.128 The Court has not
addressed evident partiality since 1968, but it has been very active in
resolving other arbitration-related issues, and the Roberts Court in
particular has taken a strong interest in arbitration.129 Thus, it is
worth looking to these decisions to see how they support the
proposal to use express waivers to avoid protracted collateral
evident-partiality litigation.130
procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of
private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability
to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”); Freyermuth, supra
note 10, at 477 (“The most evident objective sought by parties in choosing
arbitration is efficiency.”).
126. See e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985) (upholding the Circuit Court’s decision that the parties were bound
to their arbitration agreement because Congress did not “preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue”); Kendall Builders, Inc. v. Chesson,
149 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. App. 2004) (“Arbitration is founded upon the consent of
parties to forego their right to litigate disputes in our court system and instead
submit them to a private decisionmaker.”).
127. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773–74 (“Whether enforcing an agreement
to arbitrate or construing an arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must give
effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties. . . . In this
endeavor, as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
128. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013)
(enforcing class-arbitration waiver); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748, 1752 (2011)
(holding that class-wide arbitration contradicts the purposes of the FAA); Stolt-Nielsen,
130 S. Ct. at 1775 (holding that a party may not be compelled to submit to class
arbitration if there is no contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to
do so).
129. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral
Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 KAN. L. REV. 795, 796–
99 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “love affair” with arbitration over the past
three decades has led to a series of crucial decisions that began in 1983 and has
accelerated under the Roberts Court).
130. The Roberts Court’s arbitration cases have been heavily criticized for
misreading the FAA and creating unfairness for consumers. See generally, e.g., George
A. Bermann, Arbitration in the Roberts Supreme Court, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 893 (2012)
(criticizing the Roberts Court’s recent arbitration decisions as detrimental to
consumers); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: ATT Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes
Access To Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012) (describing how the Court’s Concepcion
decision would “provide companies with free rein to commit fraud, torts,
discrimination, and other harmful acts without fear of being sued”). For a brief
discussion of whether the use and enforcement of express waivers is undesirable in
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While the consent principle has long been a bedrock of the
modern Court’s arbitration jurisprudence,131 the Court’s recent
decisions in cases addressing class arbitration have been particularly
emphatic about grounding arbitration in the parties’ mutual consent,
and binding the parties to the terms of their agreements.132 In that
line of recent decisions, the Court has held that parties may not be
forced to submit to class arbitration unless they agree to it,133 and that
when they agree in the arbitration contract to forego class
arbitration, they will be held to that agreement,134 but that when they
agree to let the arbitrator decide whether the arbitration agreement
allows class arbitration, they will be held to that agreement as well.135
Taken together, then, these decisions confirm the Supreme Court’s
guidance that the parties’ agreement controls—courts should
enforce arbitral parties’ agreements about the procedures that will be
used in the arbitration, including agreements to waive procedural
rights,136 but parties must expressly agree to the use of a disputed
procedural vehicle before they will be held to it.137 These decisions
support this Article’s argument that courts should enforce parties’
agreements to use a waiver procedure and forego evident-partiality
challenges, as well as this Article’s argument that express waivers are a
better alternative to the currently more common constructive-waiver
doctrine and analysis.
While most of these decisions focus on the terms of the parties’
arbitration agreement itself,138 the important distinction for purposes
of this Article is between the parties’ prior consent to terms

light of these broader critiques of the trend towards making arbitration harder to
escape and awards harder to challenge, see infra Part III.E.
131. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (“Arbitration under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is a
matter of consent, not coercion . . . .”); but see Reuben supra note 15, at 1003–06
(arguing that since arbitration is enabled by state action, it should be subject to
due process constraints).
132. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774–75 (“It falls to courts and arbitrators
to give effect to these contractual limitations, and when doing so, courts and
arbitrators must not lose sight of the purpose of the exercise: to give effect to
the intent of the parties.”).
133. Id. at 687 (2010).
134. Am Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).
135. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2071.
136. This would include both the right to class arbitration in Italian Colors
Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. at 2309, and the right to object to the arbitrator’s
determination that the contract allows class arbitration in Oxford Health Plans, 133 S.
Ct. at 2071.
137. Stolt-Nielsen, 588 U.S. at 684.
138. The exception is Oxford Health Plans, which enforced the parties’ agreement
after arbitration had begun to let the arbitrator decide whether the arbitration
contract allowed class arbitration. 133 S. Ct. at 2071.
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governing the arbitration, and one party’s attempt to escape those
terms after the fact.139 The Court’s recent decisions rejecting such
attempts strongly support the idea that courts should similarly
enforce the parties’ mutual consent, before the arbitration, to forego
certain evident-partiality challenges in subsequent judicial
proceedings to confirm the award.140
Using and judicially enforcing express waivers of evident partiality
objections to disclose relationships furthers these fundamental
theoretical justifications and policy goals, as explained in the
Supreme Court’s decisions. Like arbitration itself, evident-partiality
waivers are consent-based. The parties can mutually agree to
prospectively forego uncertain and expensive evident-partiality
challenges, just as they can choose by their arbitration agreement to
forego more elaborate judicial process, to adopt a particular arbitral
rule set to govern their dispute, to exclude certain sorts of
procedures in the arbitration,141 to designate an institution (or none)
to conduct the arbitration, and so on. Further, the principle extends
to the enforcement of agreements made by the parties not only in the
arbitration agreement itself, but also after an arbitration is initiated
under the agreement.142 Among the Court’s recent decisions, Oxford
Health Plans makes this most clear. This case held that when the
parties consented after the arbitration had started to let the arbitrator
decide whether class arbitration was allowed under the agreement,
they could and should be held to that consent and bound to the
arbitrator’s ruling that it was allowed.143 Similarly, courts can and
should enforce evident-partiality waivers agreed to after arbitration
proceedings begin, but before the arbitration hearing occurs.

139. It is possible that the express-waiver procedure could be specified in the
parties’ arbitration agreement itself, though I believe that would be less desirable
than a waiver agreed to after disclosures but before the arbitration begins, because
the consent to the waiver would be more informed and meaningful. See infra Part
III.E (suggesting that consent between parties is more meaningful when agreed upon
before arbitration has begun).
140. See generally Curtin, supra note 95, at 367 (arguing that “the contractual
limitation of judicial review tends to promote the overall goals of both the FAA and
the New York Convention”).
141. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013)
(enforcing parties’ agreement disallowing class arbitration). But see generally David
Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 493–96 (arguing that courts’
interpretation of FAA to allow parties to create their own procedural regimes violates
Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine).
142. See, e.g., Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013) (holding
that class arbitration is allowed when arbitration agreement was silent on the
question but the parties agreed to let the arbitrator decide whether class arbitration
was allowed).
143. Id.
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The express-waiver concept is not only supported by the
jurisprudence, but also finds support in many arbitral rules, which
allow the parties to modify the arbitral procedures by mutual
consent.144 These general provisions allowing for modification by
consent would on their face allow parties to adopt this Article’s
proposal for a prearbitration procedure to agree to a waiver. They
also implicitly support the idea that the waiver should be enforced in
court, as part of the broader judicial willingness to allow parties to
choose their own arbitration procedures, and enforce those choices
in court.145
In addition, the use of waivers also promotes efficiency, flexibility
and finality—all among the principal policy justifications for
arbitration.146 Using express waivers allows parties to opt out of the
judicial disarray over evident-partiality doctrine, and the associated
costs of protracted, expensive, and uncertain evident-partiality
challenges in much the same way that arbitration doctrine writ large
allows parties to opt out of the costs and inefficiencies of litigation.
Further, since the waiver would be agreed to only after the parties
were satisfied that they had no objections to the arbitrator’s serving
based on anything disclosed by the arbitrator, there would be
correspondingly little loss in the way of fairness or fullness of
disclosure.147 Put another way, the parties would get the disclosure
they want, and save a great deal of anguish and expense on the back
end after the award is issued.148
144. See, e.g., JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES R. 2 (Judicial
Arbitration & Mediation Servs., Inc. 2009); UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES Art. 1
(United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 2010), (“[D]isputes shall be settled in
accordance with these Rules subject to such modification as the parties may agree.”);
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION art. 19(1) (United
Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf
/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf (“Subject to the provisions of
this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral
tribunal in conducting the proceedings.”).
145. See, e.g., Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2308 (rejecting the notion that courts
may invalidate arbitration agreements on the grounds that they do not permit class
arbitration of a federal-law claim); Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2066 (explaining
that class arbitration is a matter of consent with limited judicial review). But see
Horton, supra note 141, at 495 (criticizing this phenomenon).
146. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010)
(listing “lower costs, greater efficiency and speed” as the purposes of arbitration);
Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 683 (7th Cir. 1983) (describing the
FAA’s purpose as “making arbitration a swift, inexpensive, and effective substitute for
judicial dispute resolution.”); Freyermuth, supra note 10, at 477 (“The most evident
objective sought by parties in choosing arbitration is efficiency.”).
147. See infra Part III.A (discussing that parties would have an opportunity to ask
questions regarding an arbitrator’s partiality).
148. Of course, after the fact, the losing party will likely regret having given away
the right to mount an evident partiality challenge. See generally Robertson, supra note
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III. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES

A. Waivers Would Thwart the Policy of Full and Fair Disclosure
One likely objection to the use of express waivers is that allowing
waivers will thwart the policy of full and fair disclosure by arbitrators,
which is the most important aspect of the doctrine of evident
partiality.149 Some courts, particularly those invalidating an award for
evident partiality, emphasize that a policy of full disclosure is the
most important rationale for the evident-partiality doctrine.150 Often,
these courts state that under a proper reading of evident partiality,
and the underlying full-disclosure policy, arbitrators should err on
the side of the disclosure rather than nondisclosure.151
This policy is the counterweight to the policies of efficiency and
finality that support limiting the avenues for arbitral challenge and
for imposing a high bar on arbitration challenges,152 including
Many full-disclosure courts argue that
evident partiality.153
109, at 1735 (“At Time 2 one must ‘pay the alligator,’ even if one has second
thoughts about the earlier choice and wishes a different commitment had been
made.”). But the main point is that much like arbitration itself, using express waivers
can harness the parties’ ex ante eagerness for a final and efficient resolution of their
dispute to limit the ex post availability of means to challenge the result, with an
overall increase in efficiency in dispute resolution. In addition, the losing party will
save itself, in a way, from the expense and time spent pursuing an evident-partiality
challenge. Id.
149. See, e.g., Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
668 F.3d 60, 78 (2d Cir. 2012) (acknowledging “the importance of timely and full
disclosure by arbitrators”); New Regency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc.,
501 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he ‘arbitration process functions best’
where early and full arbitrator disclosure fosters ‘an amicable and trusting
atmosphere’ conducive to ‘voluntary compliance with the decree.’ “ (quoting
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (White,
J., concurring))).
150. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994) (overturning an
award, and holding that “[r]equiring arbitrators to make investigations in certain
circumstances gives arbitrators an incentive to be forthright with the parties, honestly
disclosing what arbitrators might otherwise have an incentive to hide”).
151. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 637 (Tex. 1997)
(“While a neutral arbitrator need not disclose relationships or connections that are
trivial, the conscientious arbitrator should err in favor of disclosure.”).
152. See, e.g., Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) (“Under
the FAA, courts may vacate an arbitrator’s decision only in very unusual
circumstances. That limited judicial review, we have explained, maintain[s]
arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. If parties could take
full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals, arbitration would become merely a prelude to
a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process.” (alterations in
original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stolt-Nielsen S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010) (“Petitioners contend that
the decision of the arbitration panel must be vacated, but in order to obtain that
relief, they must clear a high hurdle.”).
153. See, e.g., Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 683 (7th Cir. 1983)
(discussing the narrow standards for judicial intervention of the arbitration process
even when losing parties bring evident-partiality challenges).
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requiring robust up-front disclosure (with vigorous policing of that
disclosure in court) is not only fairest but also most efficient. They
argue that the best way to reduce inefficient judicial evidentpartiality challenges is a pro-disclosure rule, on the theory that if
arbitrators understand that they should err on the side of
disclosure, they will consistently do so and courts will have to do
less post-award policing of the disclosure line.154
Based on these policies, it might be argued that allowing or
encouraging express waivers is counter-productive insofar as these
waivers undermine the policies of full, fair, and up-front disclosure.
If waivers were common, arbitrators could withhold relevant
information in their disclosures, safe in the knowledge that the
parties will have waived any ability to challenge their service for
evident partiality based on the withheld information.
There are a few satisfactory responses to this objection, however.
One is that arbitrators already have an independent ethical duty to
make full and fair disclosures,155 which they would be violating by
withholding information from their disclosures to parties to an
arbitration. In addition, arbitrators also have strong reputational
incentives to be forthcoming in their disclosures. An arbitrator who
is thought of as partial, and especially one who is perceived to be
dishonest in disclosure, is unlikely to be a very popular arbitrator.156
Further, the waiver procedure described above actually would
increase the fullness and fairness of disclosures, in a way specifically
targeted to the parties’ actual concerns.157 That is, routine use of an
express-waiver procedure in arbitrations would focus the parties’
attention more intently on the arbitrator’s disclosures, and lead them
to elicit follow-up information about relationships that might bother
them, precisely because they know that failure to investigate will
mean giving up their opportunity to challenge the arbitrator based
on the relationship. Express waivers would focus the parties’

154. See, e.g., TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at 637 (“The rule of full disclosure minimizes the
role of the judiciary, vesting greater control in the parties who have chosen the
arbitration process. If faithfully adhered to, it will ultimately lead to fewer postdecision challenges to awards based on bias or prejudice.”).
155. See supra note 19 (finding examples of ethical rules or canons prescribing this
duty from various different arbitration rules).
156. See, e.g., Bowles Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013
(10th Cir. 1994) (“[A]rbitrators [are] selected because of their reputations for truth
and fairness and for their expertise.”).
157. See supra Part II.A (suggesting that waivers would incentivize parties to look
into arbitrator’s potential partiality prior to arbitration); see also TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at
637 (implying that the goal of the disclosure rule should be to “vest[] greater control
in the parties who have chosen the arbitration process”).
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attention on the disclosure process in a way the currently muddled
doctrine of constructive waiver cannot.158
Express waivers will also increase efficiency in a way that a fulldisclosure rule will not. Despite what some courts have said, the idea
that erring on the side of disclosure will reduce judicial evidentpartiality challenges seems to simply be incorrect, as even
jurisdictions endorsing a “full disclosure” standard experience a great
deal of litigation and uncertain results.159
Finally, in addition to noting that using express waivers will not
thwart the policy of fair disclosure, it is important to note that there
are other policy goals to be served besides simply requiring absolute
disclosure, as some versions of the evident-partiality doctrine seem to
encourage.160 Disclosure takes time and has costs161, and policies of
efficiency and finality argue against a disclosure standard that
requires close judicial scrutiny or whether the arbitrator disclosed as
much as possible.162 A rule that requires total and fulsome disclosure
opens the door to evident-partiality challenges that are merely
arguments about whether the arbitrator gave enough details about a
relationship, and originate from disappointment with the result.163
In contrast, a procedure of disclosure, follow-up, and sealing the
disclosure process with a waiver allows the parties to choose their own
158. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (noting current uncertainty in
constructive waiver doctrine).
159. For example, the Texas Supreme Court’s assertion that a “rule of full
disclosure minimizes the role of the judiciary,” TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at 637, seems to be
belied by the amount of evident-partiality litigation brought in Texas courts (and
reaching Texas’s appellate courts) under TUCO’s rule. See, e.g., Ponderosa Pine
Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. App. 2012) (entertaining
an evident-partiality challenge even after full disclosure by an arbitrator); Karlseng v.
Cooke, 346 S.W.3d 85, 87–93 (Tex. App. 2011) (remanding arbitration award after
finding of evident-partiality); Skidmore Energy, Inc. v. Maxus (U.S.) Exploration Co.,
345 S.W.3d 672 (Tex. App. 2011) (accepting an arbitration award as valid and
binding over objections by the losing party); Amoco D.T. Co. v. Occidental Petrol.
Corp., 343 S.W.3d 837 (Tex. App. 2011) (overturning a binding arbitration award
based on evident-partiality).
160. See, e.g., New Regency Prods., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d
1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007) (“While we are cognizant of the public interest in efficient
and final arbitration, we believe that a rule encouraging arbitrators to err on the side
of disclosure is consistent with that interest.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
TUCO, 960 S.W.2d at 637 (“While a neutral arbitrator need not disclose
relationships or connections that are trivial, the conscientious arbitrator should
err in favor of disclosure.”)
161. See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151
(1968) (White, J., concurring) (“[The arbitrator] cannot be expected to provide the
parties with his complete and unexpurgated business biography.”).
162. See supra notes 49–59 and accompanying text (explaining these competing
policies and courts’ attempts to balance them in the evident-partiality case law).
163. See, e.g., ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir.
1999) (“The approach proposed by ANR would permit a ‘disgruntled party’ to seize
upon an undisclosed relationship ‘as a pretext for invalidating the award.’”).
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level of scrutiny into details, and then closes the door on judicial
challenges attempting later to argue that more should have been
provided. The other interests at stake, including the policies of
efficiency, certainty, and finality, can outweigh the policy goal of total
disclosure, or at least they should be allowed to outweigh it when the
parties themselves so choose, based on the fundamental arbitral
principle of consent.164 That is, the express-waiver procedure allows
the parties to consensually balance the competing policies for
themselves, rather than being at the mercy of the courts’ confused
and confusing attempts to do so. This is wholly consistent with the
more basic principle that arbitration should be promoted as a way for
parties to similarly, by mutual consent, avoid the vagaries, expenses,
and uncertainties of judicial proceedings in general.165
B. Waivers Would Sanction Fraud by Arbitrators and Parties
A related, and perhaps more serious objection, is that waivers
would not only discourage full disclosure, they would allow and
sanction fraud on the part of arbitrators. That is, if waivers were
commonly used and enforced by courts, arbitrators could willfully
withhold material information about their relationships with parties,
or even deliberately omit them entirely, tricking unsuspecting parties
who would then be stuck with the waiver even if they later discovered
the fraud. While most evident-partiality cases indicate that at most an
arbitrator was remiss or less than forthcoming in their disclosures,
there are some cases with facts strongly suggesting that the arbitrator
and one party were indeed willfully deceiving the other party.166
Further, it could be argued that if waivers became more common,
arbitrators would become more brazen, because they would be less
likely to be caught and held to account.
There are two compelling responses to this objection. One is that
fraud is itself an enumerated ground for challenging an arbitral

164. See supra Part II.C (explaining the fundamental role of consent in
providing theoretical justification for the enforcement of express waivers of
evident-partiality challenges).
165. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775
(2010) (“In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate
review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution:
lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert
adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”).
166. See, e.g., Karlseng v. Cooke, 346 S.W.3d 85, 87–93 (Tex. App. 2011)
(arbitrator—a former judge—failed to disclose his relationship with one of the
parties’ attorneys and introduced himself to the attorney at the arbitration hearing as
if he were a stranger even though the attorney and arbitrator had a close, extensive
personal friendship that included the attorney giving valuable gifts to the arbitrator).
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award under the FAA.167 Another is that use of “narrow” waivers
endorsed by this Article would be much less likely to sanction fraud,
because such waivers would only waive challenges based on
relationships that were disclosed by the arbitrator.168 The ability to
perpetrate a fraud would be much reduced, and much riskier, if the
arbitrator attempted to do so by making a partial or misleading
disclosure of a material relationship, because the attempt to mislead
could be easily uncovered by a party’s asking questions about it.169
C. Waivers Would or Should Be Unenforceable Under Statute
or Arbitral Rules
Another potential objection is that express waivers of evidentpartiality objections would be forbidden or unenforceable under
statute or under specific arbitral rule sets. However, the FAA does
not prohibit the practice, and the statute’s purposes, as read in the
most recent decisions of the Supreme Court, seem instead to
encourage it. Similarly, the practice would not be at odds with most
arbitral rules, and many arbitral rule sets explicitly allow or
encourage express waivers.
1.

Use of express waivers of partiality challenges does not contradict the FAA
Nothing in the FAA expressly forbids parties from agreeing to
waive a challenge based on evident partiality. Nor is there any
language in the statute expressly authorizing such waivers.170 The
question, then, is whether the statute should be read to forbid or
authorize such waivers, and the better view is that it does not
forbid them.171
Courts should not read into the FAA a prohibition on such waivers
for the reasons of practical usefulness and theoretical soundness that
are explained above.172 Moreover, the constructive-waiver doctrine
167. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2012) (allowing vacatur “where the award was procured
by . . . fraud”).
168. See supra notes 104–106 and accompanying text (discussing the difference
between narrower and broader forms of waiver).
169. See, e.g., Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, Inc., 376 S.W.3d
358, 372 (Tex. App. 2012) (holding that “a few basic and obvious questions posted to
[the arbitrator] when the disclosure was received would have adduced the very
information that they are now complaining about”).
170. In contrast, the English Arbitration Act of 1996, c. 23, §§ 5, 6(1), 69(1)
(Eng.), does have express language allowing parties to waive (in writing) the right to
judicial review. See generally Curtin, supra note 95, at 358 (examining the use and
enforcement of these “exclusion agreements” under English law).
171. See Curtin, supra note 95, at 367 (arguing that contractual limitation of
judicial review is consistent with the purposes of the FAA).
172. See supra Part II.
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that is already applied and enforced by most courts (albeit
inconsistently) implies that courts have already concluded that
parties can waive an objection based on evident-partiality.173 There is
no principled reason that parties should not be able to achieve
expressly by mutual consent what they may do constructively and
unilaterally by failing to timely object.174
Instead, limiting the scope of judicial challenge to arbitration
awards by mutual agreement is supported by recent Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the FAA. These decisions have consistently
supported judicial enforcement of party agreements about what
procedures and challenges should be available in and after the
arbitration,175 at least to the extent that these limit, rather than
expand, judicial review.176 The Court’s class-arbitration decisions
have made clear that the FAA even elevates the parties’ mutual

173. See, e.g., Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Cos., 137 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1998)
(“While they did not have full knowledge of all the relationships to which they now
object, they did have concerns about Powers’ impartiality and yet chose to have her
remain on the panel rather than spend time and money investigating further until
losing the arbitration.”); DT-Trak Consulting, Inc. v. Prue, 814 N.W.2d 804, 809–10
(S.D. 2012) (“[T]he well accepted rule in arbitration cases is that a party who fails to
raise a claim of partiality against an arbitrator prior to or during the arbitration
proceeding is deemed to have waived the right to challenge the decision based on
‘evident partiality.’” (quoting Daiichi Haw. Real Estate Corp. v. Lichter, 82 P.3d 411,
431–32 (Haw. 2003))); Kendall Builders, Inc. v. Chesson, 149 S.W.3d 796, 804 (Tex.
App. 2004) (“[A] party can waive an otherwise valid objection to the partiality of the
arbitrator by proceeding with arbitration despite knowledge of facts giving rise to
such an objection.”).
174. Some courts have held that in fact there can be no waiver unless the
challenging party knew all the facts about the challenged relationship. See, e.g.,
Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1204 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Waiver
applies only where a party has acted with full knowledge of the facts.”); Apperson v.
Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1359 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding no waiver of
evident-partiality challenge unless challenger knew “all the facts” supporting the
alleged bias during the proceedings). However, these cases are in conflict with those
recognizing that a party can waive its bias objection even if it did not know all of the
operative facts, so long as it knew enough to give notice of the potentially
objectionable relationship. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d
1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that constructive waiver by failing to timely
object “is the better approach in light of our policy favoring the finality of arbitration
awards”); JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42,
52 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that the party who “was put on notice of the risk when it
signed the contract [and] chose not to inquire about the backgrounds of the
Committee members either before or during the hearing” could not challenge on
evident partiality grounds); Kiernan, 137 F.3d at 593 (holding that a party waives its
right to an evident-partiality claim when the party “weigh[s] their options at the time
of [the arbitrator’s] disclosures and chooses to go forward” with arbitration).
175. See, e.g., Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013)
(enforcing party agreement after arbitration began to let arbitrator decide whether
the parties’ contract provided for class arbitration).
176. See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008)
(holding that parties could not by agreement expand the available avenues for
judicial review).
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agreement as to the terms and procedures of the arbitration over
contrary state laws, or federal statutes’ policy goals.177 Thus, the
policy of enforcing the parties’ agreement that the Court has
repeatedly identified as the fundamental bedrock of the FAA would
support enforcing the parties’ mutual agreement to forego certain
evident partiality challenges. This outcome does not contradict any
statutory policies, and is in keeping with at least some sets of
arbitral rules.178
Nor would it be correct to contend that, by listing certain avenues
for challenging awards, the FAA itself contains an implicit policy that
those avenues of challenge cannot be waived. While the Supreme
Court held in Hall Street Associates that parties may not increase the
scope of judicial review beyond statutory limits by mutual consent,
the Court’s reasoning implies that the parties may by mutual consent
limit the scope of that review more narrowly than the statutory
baseline.179 In Hall Street, the Court read the FAA to require
confirmation of an award unless one of the statute’s prescribed
exceptions applied; that is, the Court rejected the argument that
parties to an arbitration agreement may contract for expanded
judicial review of the award.180 In doing so, the Court noted parties’
ability to “tailor some, even many, features of arbitration,”181 and
warned against expanded judicial review that would “bring
arbitration theory to grief in postarbitration process.”182 The Court’s
concern was expanding judicial review, not limiting it, and so Hall
Street seems to favor a one-way ratchet that allows parties to
tighten, but not to loosen, the scope for judicial review of an
arbitration award.183
Indeed, to more closely follow the Supreme Court’s decisions
enforcing limitations on arbitration procedures, the express waiver of
evident-partiality challenges could be written into the parties’
177. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (finding
that the FAA preempted California state law that invalidated class action waivers as
unconscionable); see also Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304,
2309–10 (2013) (finding that a mutually agreed waiver of class arbitration trumped
the statutory policies behind the Sherman and Clayton Acts).
178. See infra notes 177–80 and accompanying text.
179. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585–86 (2008) (rejecting Hall
Street’s request for general review of an arbitrator’s decision).
180. Id. at 587.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 588.
183. Id.; see also Curtin, supra note 95, at 367 (“[W]hile the contractual limitation
of judicial review tends to promote the overall goals of both the FAA and the New
York Convention, contractual expansion tends to contradict, at least in part, some of
the goals of the FAA and the New York Convention.”).
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arbitration agreement itself, through the inclusion of a clause stating
that all evident-partiality challenges are waived after arbitrators are
appointed and the disclosure process is completed without objection
from either side. This alternative would have the advantage of
making the mutual decision to forego any evident-partiality
challenges part of the parties’ arbitration contract, which the
Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed is paramount.184 This
approach, however, would commit the parties to the waiver before
the disclosure process had taken place, which would have significant
disadvantages.185 But the broader point is that there is room for
flexibility as to the timing of the waiver, and parties could tailor the
procedure to fit their own specific needs.186
2. Use of express waivers is supported by arbitral rules allowing parties to
modify procedures by consent
The provisions of various arbitral rules also support the use of
express-waiver procedure to eliminate certain evident-partiality
challenges. As an initial matter, in an ad hoc arbitration, parties
would be free to adopt a waiver procedure, since the definition of ad
hoc arbitration is that parties may adopt their own procedures.187
Beyond that, many sets of arbitral rules make clear that the parties
may modify the arbitration procedures by consent.188 These types of
184. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773–
74 (2010) (“Whether enforcing an agreement to arbitrate or construing an
arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must ‘give effect to the contractual rights
and expectations of the parties.’” (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989))).
185. Disadvantages include eliminating the parties’ flexibility to tinker with the
scope of the waiver after disclosures have been made, see infra Part III.D, and
reducing the degree to which consent to the waiver is meaningful and informed, see
infra Part III.E.
186. See generally infra Part III.D (discussing the potential for flexibility in the scope
of the waiver).
187. See, e.g., Slate, supra note 27, at 52–53 (describing how parties in ad hoc
arbitration must either develop their own rules or adopt standard rules such as
UNCITRAL rules). Even if the article’s proposal were limited to ad hoc arbitrations,
however, a substantial amount of arbitrations would be covered. See, e.g., CHARTERED INST.
OF ARBITRATORS, CIArb Costs of International Arbitration Survey 2011, 7 (2011), available at
http://www.ciarb.org/conferences/costs/2011/09/28/CIArb%20costs%20of%20
International%20Arbitration%20Survey%202011.pdf (discussing a study undertaken
by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators in which, out of 254 international
arbitrations, sixty-two percent were administered by institutions and thirty-eight
percent were ad hoc).
188. See, e.g., JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES R. 2 (Judicial
Arbitration & Mediation Servs., Inc. 2009) (“The Parties may agree on any
procedures not specified herein or in lieu of these Rules that are consistent with the
applicable law and JAMS policies . . . . The Parties shall promptly notify JAMS of any
such Party-agreed procedures and shall confirm such procedures in writing. The
Party-agreed procedures shall be enforceable as if contained in these Rules.”);

DAWSON.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1/9/2014 3:44 PM

348

[Vol. 63:307

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

provisions would clearly allow parties to adopt a procedure for
agreeing to an express waiver of evident-partiality challenges.
Moreover, some rules, notably the UNCITRAL rules, go even
further and specify that the parties may agree to waive any recourse
to judicial authority to challenge the award, so far as such a waiver is
consistent with applicable law.189 That is, the rules specifically
endorse the idea of an agreed party waiver of judicial review.190
D. Narrow Waivers Would Not Do Enough and Broad Waivers Would Do
Too Much
Another set of objections are practical: narrow waivers would not
accomplish much because they would only limit challenges that can
be disposed of using constructive-waiver doctrine, while broad
waivers would accomplish too much by eliminating compelling
partiality challenges.
It might be argued that narrow waivers that merely forbid
challenges based on disclosed relationships would not accomplish
anything of value. Since constructive-waiver doctrine exists, it is
already the case that any challenges based on disclosed relationships
will or should fail. However, this argument ignores the fact that
constructive-waiver doctrine is inconsistently applied from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, or trial court to trial court. Further,
courts can and do bypass the doctrine and perform a straightforward
evident-partiality analysis, even when an institutional arbitrator has

UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Art. 19(1) (United
Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 2006) (“Subject to the provisions of this Law,
the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal
in conducting the proceedings.”).
189. UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES Annex (Possible Waiver Statement) (United
Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 2010) (“If the parties wish to exclude recourse
against the arbitral award that may be available under the applicable law, they may
consider adding a provision to that effect as suggested below, considering, however,
that the effectiveness and conditions of such an exclusion depend on the applicable
law.”). “Applicable law” in this context would mean the law of the nation in whose
courts the award would be enforced; so, in this case, American law and specifically
the FAA.
190. Finally, to the extent any extant arbitral rules do prohibit such waivers, or
prescribe procedures that would conflict with an express-waiver procedure, those
rules could be revisited or revised. See, e.g., Paul D. Friedland & John M. Townsend,
Commentary on the July 2003 Revisions to the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, DISP.
RESOL. J., Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 8 (describing revision of AAA commercialarbitration rules by AAA); Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical
Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 885, 913 (2007) (describing the rule-revision process
for the UNCITRAL rules).
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already expressed a view in the arbitration that any challenges based
on a particular, disclosed relationship would be waived.191
Further, even if most constructive-waiver defenses were successful,
using an express waiver is an excellent way to avoid the cost and
expense of litigating long-shot partiality challenges at the trial and
potentially appellate level. Indeed, waivers should be especially
efficient if most constructive-waiver defenses are successful, since
these are a particularly inefficient and wasteful form of challenge.
This is because, ex ante, a party might well rationally decide to forego
such low-probability challenges even in the event that they lose the
arbitration, whereas ex post the incentives change and a party might
bring them even though they are unlikely to succeed.192
Relatedly, it might be argued that litigation of waivers of
“disclosed” relationships would simply collapse into arguing about
whether the relationship was sufficiently disclosed, which is the same
thing as conducting a constructive-waiver analysis. However, the
existence of an agreed waiver would add significant clarity to the
analysis, and leave parties less at the mercy of the conflicting
jurisprudence about how much information is enough.193 Using
waivers would harness the gap between pre- and post- award
incentives to eliminate a significant number of costly and expensive

191. See ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 496–502 (4th Cir.
1999) (observing the AAA stated prior to the arbitration that “[u]nless we are advised
to the contrary . . . we will assume that the Parties waive any presumption of bias by
the Arbitrator based on this disclosure,” the losing party filed an evident-partiality
objection after the award, and the court undertook an evident-partiality analysis
rather than discussing the waiver).
192. After the loss, the answer would likely be different, because a low-hope
challenge is better than no hope, and also because often there is significant value to
the losing party in the mere fact of being able to delay enforcement of the award
through collateral litigation. But the value of delay is not one sanctioned by
arbitration doctrine; instead, is very much what those policies and doctrines aim to
prevent. See, e.g., Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 42 (10th Cir. 1986) (“Because a
primary purpose behind arbitration agreements is to avoid the expense and delay of
court proceedings, it is well settled that judicial review of an arbitration award is very
narrowly limited.” (citations omitted)); Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle
Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC, 282 P.3d 1217, 1231 (Cal. 2012) (noting that public policy
“strongly favors” arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of
dispute resolution).
193. See, e.g., JCI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324
F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2003) (declining to find evident-partiality when the party that
lost arbitration claims disclosures beforehand were not thorough enough); Apperson
v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1359 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); Kiernan v. Piper
Jaffray Cos., 137 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); see also supra notes 67–69 and
accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty over constructive-waiver doctrine).
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challenges, and do so in a way that is most likely to eliminate the most
worthless or inefficient challenges.194
Conversely, it might be argued that if parties used the “broad” form
of waiver,195 waiving all evident-partiality challenges including those
based on relationships entirely undisclosed by the arbitrator, waivers
would go too far. As mentioned, the Article to this point has focused
on narrower waivers in which the parties would agree only to waive
evident-partiality challenges as to relationships disclosed by the
arbitrator. And blanket, broad waivers would be more problematic
because they raise the prospect of situations where the arbitrator
deliberately fails to disclose a relationship with an obvious potential
for partiality, for which there are no consequences on the basis of a
blanket waiver.196 The potential for fraud and unfairness in this
situation is much greater.
Such waivers could be enforced, at least absent a showing that the
waiver itself was induced by fraud,197 but they would be more
problematic, and therefore, should be disfavored as compared to a
more limited waiver of challenges based on disclosed relationships.
While express waivers of all evident-partiality challenges certainly
would increase finality and efficiency, as well as arbitrator peace of
mind, the trade off in terms of potential for fraud and misconduct
would simply be too great.
However, while overly broad blanket waivers would be undesirable,
this does raise the related point that there is room for flexibility in
the scope of the waiver, which could be used to increase efficiency
and finality through the parties’ mutual consent. For example, a
waiver might provide for foregoing evident partiality challenges based
not only on disclosed relationships but also on any relationships that
were undisclosed but unknown to the arbitrator. This would reduce
and clarify post-award litigation raising challenges based on
relationships unknown to the arbitrator. If the defender could show
the arbitrator did not know about the relationship, the challenge
194. See supra Part II.B (arguing that pre-arbitration waivers of evident-partiality
claims will encourage parties to seek arbitration and discourage parties to appeal
arbitration awards).
195. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text (comparing broad and
narrow forms of waiver).
196. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1997)
(noting that the arbitrator knew, but did not disclose, that his acquisition of a case
stemmed from a referral which involved his co-arbitrator’s law firm); see also Olson v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 51 F.3d 157, 159 (8th Cir. 1995)
(asserting arbitrator did not disclose his job titles nor his employer’s business
relationship with Merrill Lynch).
197. See supra Part III.B (discussing how express waivers could be overcome in
cases where the waiver can be shown to have been induced by fraud).
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would fail.198 By consent, parties would create clarity in advance
about the significance of unknown relationships that, if otherwise left
to resolution by litigation, would face numerous questions:
uncertainty and judicial division over whether evident partiality can
be established by showing the arbitrator’s “constructive knowledge”
of a material relationship or whether the arbitrator has an
independent duty to investigate and discover potential conflicts.199
The broader point is that express waivers would allow the parties to
tailor for themselves what kind of evident-partiality challenges to
allow and forbid, rather than being at the mercy of different courts’
interpretation and application of the doctrine. And that sort of
flexibility through mutual consent is directly in line with arbitration’s
fundamental policy justifications and its mission to let the parties
contract out of judicial procedures they find inefficient.200
E. Narrowing Avenues for Challenging Arbitration Awards Is Generally
Undesirable
While mostly beyond the scope of this Article, one last objection is
worth briefly addressing. It might be argued that, even if express
waivers of evident partiality challenges are an effective way to reduce
the volume of litigation challenging arbitral awards, such a result is
undesirable.
Many have criticized the Supreme Court’s
proarbitration trend, which includes limiting ways to challenge
awards.201 These critics point out that making arbitral results harder
to challenge is undesirable because of unfairness in the way
arbitration agreements are formed, in particular unequal bargaining
power to enter arbitration agreements in consumer or employment

198. See, e.g., Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc.,
146 F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that there is no independent
duty to investigate under the FAA where the arbitrator is unaware of the
undisclosed facts).
199. Compare Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
“though [the arbitrator] lacked actual knowledge, he had constructive knowledge of
[the undisclosed relationship],” which was enough to find evident partiality), with AlHarbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680, 682–83 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that, because
the arbitrator did not have actual knowledge of the undisclosed relationship, there
was no evident partiality even though the arbitrator did not conduct an investigation
to uncover such a relationship).
200. See supra Part III.C (arguing that the purposes of arbitration are to
individualize resolution and avoid the rigid procedural necessities that come
with litigation).
201. But see Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator as Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not
Always Pro-arbitration, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1013, 1026 (2010) (arguing that “deferential
review . . . is not always pro-arbitration”).
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contexts.202 They also often criticize as misreadings of the FAA and
prior arbitration case law the Roberts Court’s recent decisions
making arbitration awards harder to challenge and rigorously enforcing
party agreements to forego procedures such as class arbitration, on
which this Article has relied for the theoretical justifications for
enforcing express waivers of evident-partiality challenges.203
If the trend towards making arbitration awards harder to challenge
(and making more claims arbitrable) is undesirable, then perhaps
using express waivers of evident partiality to further reduce avenues
to challenge arbitral awards would simply be reinforcing that bad
trend. While it is not this Article’s main purpose to consider broader
critiques of the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence, a
few responses can be offered to this objection.
First, to the extent critiques of the current trends in arbitration
case law are based on the argument that “consent” to arbitration is a
fiction, or based on coercion,204 the force of this argument is reduced
as applied to waivers that are agreed to after arbitration has begun.
This is because it will be more apparent to the parties that there is a
real dispute and that waiving rights will have consequences for that
dispute.205 That is, the consent will be more meaningful.
202. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer
Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001) (discussing the negative
effects of binding mandatory arbitration in consumer or employment contexts);
Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A
Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP RES. 267 (1995)
(questioning mandatory binding arbitration as a matter of public policy); David S.
Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1252–53
(2009) (arguing that mandatory arbitration agreements are unfair when the parties
agreeing have unequal bargaining power); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005) (discussing the impact that
mandatory binding arbitration has on the individual parties); Wilson, supra note 86,
at 107–09. But see Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL. 549,
552 (2008) (“[T]he proper question then, is whether eliminating predispute
arbitration agreements for wide swaths of the economy yields a net benefit. That is
the burden confronting advocates of arbitration reform and one that, based on my
review of the available empirical evidence, they have not met.”); David Sherwyn et al.,
Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1557, 1578 (2005) (“[T]here is no evidence that plaintiffs fare significantly
better in litigation.”).
203. See, e.g., Bermann supra note 130, at 909 (critiquing the Court for being
willing to override “established understandings in the U.S. law of arbitration”).
204. See generally Horton, supra note 141, at 487 (arguing that in consumer and
employment contexts, arbitration clauses are not the product of actual consent).
205. The concern is not entirely eliminated, since the imbalances in sophistication
or bargaining power at the root of some of these concerns, see, e.g., Horton, supra
note 138, at 487, will still be present after the arbitration process has started.
However, once the arbitration has begun, and especially if the claimant has counsel,
the implications of agreeing to a waiver should be much more salient than the
implications of agreeing to arbitration as part of a boilerplate consumer or
employment agreement. This is one reason to favor a waiver process that takes place
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Second, even if it is generally undesirable to reduce substantive
avenues to challenge arbitral awards, expand the domain of claims
that can be arbitrated, and increase parties’ ability to restrict available
procedural vehicles in arbitration, evident-partiality doctrine is not a
good solution to these ills.206 The evident-partiality doctrine is not
meant to serve as a general safety valve for arbitration, and using it in
that way produces significant inefficiencies. It leads to collateral
litigation flyspecking the arbitrator’s disclosures and second-guessing
her impartiality, which has little to do with the bases of most critiques
of the Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence.207 The policies served by
evident-partiality and disclosure doctrine—ensuring a neutral
tribunal in the most procedurally efficient way—do not directly speak
to whether it is fair to arbitrate at all, to disallow certain procedures,
or to force arbitration of particular types of substantive claims.
Instead, these ills are best addressed legislatively, through
amendment of the FAA.208
Further, the uncertainty in evident-partiality doctrine opens up this
inefficient litigation in all sorts of arbitrations, including ones where
arbitration was agreed to by two sophisticated parties of relatively
equal bargaining power. Indeed, many evident-partiality cases are
these types of cases, in part because it is often the sophisticated party
that has the savvy resources, and incentive to pursue litigation to try
after arbitration has begun, but before the arbitration hearing starts, rather than
writing waiver language into arbitration agreements themselves. See supra note 185
and accompanying text.
206. Cf. Bruhl, supra note 78, at 1422 (noting the “sort of hydraulic pressure in the
system that will seek release through whatever channel still exists for invalidating, or
at least limiting, arbitration agreements”).
207. Cf. id. at 1437–39 (analyzing the use of unconscionability doctrine as a way
for arbitration-skeptical courts to police particular objectionable aspects of
arbitration agreements).
208. There have been repeated legislative efforts, so far unsuccessful, to eliminate
arbitration in employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil-rights disputes. See, e.g.,
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. § 402(a) (2013) (“[N]o
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires
arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil
rights dispute.”); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R.
5129, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2969, 109th Cong.
(2005); H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2435, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 2282,
107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 815, 107th Cong. (2001); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, On
Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent
Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 458 (2011) (discussing the repeated
introduction of such legislation); Schwartz, supra note 202, at 1250 (noting that
“there is a significant possibility that the FAA could be amended to make predispute
arbitration clauses unenforceable in most adhesion contracts. At this important
juncture, . . . academic commentators are increasingly addressing themselves to
legislators rather than courts” (footnote omitted)). The enactment of this or a
similar bill would not undermine this Article’s arguments for using express waivers of
evident-partiality challenges in contexts where arbitration was allowed.
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and unearth information that can be used to support an evident
partiality challenge.209
Thus, even if the criticisms of current trends in arbitration
jurisprudence are well-taken as to their potential to harm parties to
one-sided consumer or employment arbitration agreements, express
waivers of evident-partiality objections would still be a useful tool.
Express waivers are nevertheless especially valuable when
sophisticated parties make a truly negotiated arbitration agreement
and an informed prearbitration decision to forego potential
expensive and uncertain evident-partiality litigation.210
CONCLUSION
Someday, the Supreme Court may take a case to resolve the
current disarray in the doctrine of evident partiality. When it does, it
may clarify some of the pressing, vexed questions courts currently
face about how to define and apply that doctrine. The solution it
selects may be drawn from the extensive body of existing scholarship
209. See, e.g., Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
668 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012) (reinsurance company versus reinsurance company);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2005) (insurance
company versus insurance company); Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal
Constructors, Inc., 304 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2002) (construction company and
insurance company versus development partnership); Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga
Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 2004) (bank versus jewelry corporation); Crow
Constr. v. Jeffrey M. Brown Assocs. Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 217 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
(construction company versus general contractor); Lexington Ins. Co. & Chartis, Inc.
v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 101 So. 3d 1190 (Ala. 2012) (insurance company versus
construction company); U.S. Elecs., Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 958 N.E.2d 891
(N.Y. 2011) (electronics corporation versus radio corporation); Skidmore Energy,
Inc. v. Maxus (U.S.) Exploration Co., 345 S.W.3d 672 (Tex. App. 2011) (energy
exploration corporation versus energy exploration corporation); Amoco D.T. Co. v.
Occidental Petrol. Corp., 343 S.W.3d 837 (Tex. App. 2011) (energy partnership
versus energy company); GJR Mgmt. Holdings, L.P. v. Jack Raus, Ltd., 126 S.W.3d
257 (Tex. App. 2003) (limited partnership versus construction contractor and
subcontractor); Int’l Bank of Commerce-Brownsville v. Int’l Energy Dev. Corp., 981
S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App. 1998) (bank versus energy development corporation). But
see, e.g., Nasca v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 12 P.3d 346 (Colo. App. 2000)
(insured individual versus insurance company); Carpenter v. Brooks, 534 S.E.2d
641 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (investor versus investment corporations); Roe v.
Ladymon, 318 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. App. 2010) (homeowner versus home renovator
limited liability partnership).
210. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 642–43 (1996) (“[I]t is
critical to distinguish between commercial arbitration voluntarily agreed to by
parties of approximately equal bargaining power, and commercial arbitration
forced upon unknowing consumers, franchisees, employees or others through the
use of form contracts.”). Without taking a position on whether indeed the
application of arbitration to consumer and employment contracts should be rolled
back, the narrower point here is that even if it were, express waivers of evidentpartiality objections would still be a useful tool for parties that courts could and
should enforce.
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attempting to clarify this murky area of law. But the prospect of
clarification is not great, since the Court has only weighed in on
evident-partiality once, over 40 years ago, and has not shown any
inclination to clarify, despite the acknowledged and expanding
disarray in lower courts.
Until then, parties to arbitrations are left with a muddle that can
produce costly and expensive post-award litigation. Express waivers
of the sort advocated for by this Article are a good way to avoid these
challenges.
Express agreements to forego evident-partiality
challenges have great practical attractiveness and sound theoretical
justifications, certainly when limited to waivers of evident partiality
challenges based on any relationship present in the arbitrator’s
disclosures. Therefore, parties and panels should use them and
courts should enforce them.

